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This study investigates the impact of the corporate environmental management on firms’ cost 
of debt financing. Using environmental scores issued by Thomas Reuters on 138 firms in 
Europe from 2007 to 2016, I find that environmental performance has a negative relationship 
with the cost of debt financing. This relationship holds in Europe and for bonds whose 
maturity is higher than five years. However, the economic significance of this relationship is 
modest, suggesting that the environmental management has a minor influence on firms’ risk. 













A recent survey published by the CFA (2017) reveals that 73% of investors take the 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors into account in their investment 
decisions. Moreover, this survey found that the relevance of each of the three ESG factors has 
increased between 2015 and 2017. This increased awareness of ESG factors has developed in 
response to events such as the BP oil spill in 2010 and the Volkswagen Diesel scandal in 
2015. These two events clearly demonstrated the influence that environmental performance 
(EP) can have on firms’ stock price and credit ratings. Indeed, the stock price of Volkswagen 
fell dramatically after admitting the creation of a deception mechanism and issuing a public 
apology on 18th September 2015. Shortly after this public announcement of wrongdoings, 
Standard and Poor’s downgraded the long-term credit rating of Volkswagen from A to A- 
and then BBB+ later that year. The strength of the market reaction after the BP oil spill and 
the Volkswagen scandal implies that the environmental factors are of particular importance. 
While the effects of the environmental performance (EP) in the equity market have been 
studied extensively, little is known about its influence in the bond market. This study 
provides some insight into this relationship.  
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between the cost of debt financing and EP in 
Europe, Australia and Japan. In particular, I examine the conditions under which this 
relationship holds. I attempt to answer the following questions: Is there a relationship 
between the cost of debt financing and the EP? How does this relationship change across 
bond maturities and how does this relationship change across industries and regions? This 
research is based on the theory that EP can lower reputational, legal and regulatory firms’ 
risks. This lower risk is translated into lower risk premium in the bond market. To answer 
those questions, I used the environmental scores (ES) provided by Thomas Reuters as proxy 
for EP. I hypothesize that the firms with higher ES show lower risk and hence risk premium.  
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Better understanding of the environmental risk could provide investors with further 
information about their risk exposure and assist them in making investment decision. This 
could also help managers make decisions about improving their EP as they could better judge 
whether their environmental investments will bring about financial benefits.  
I also include the Social and Governance Score in the analysis. However, it is not the 
purpose of the paper to give a comprehensive analysis of their relationship with the cost of 
debt financing. The primary focus of this paper is the EP.  
Consistent with the theory, this study documents a statistically significant negative 
relationship between the cost of debt financing and the environmental management. Firms’ 
commitment and effectiveness towards reducing emissions and firms’ ability to create 
innovative products and innovative way to reduce environmental cost are the two factors 
leading to a lower cost of debt. However, the results are not economically significant with a 
maximum reduction of 2.27 basis point. Furthermore, the study finds that the negative 
relationship between the cost of debt financing and the EP holds especially for bonds issued 
in Europe and bonds whose maturity is higher than 5 years. Finally, my analysis did not 
provide evidence about a consistent stronger relationship in high risk industries. However, 
the difference in cost of debt between the best environmentally performing firms and the 
worst ones is higher in high-risk industries. 
This paper contributes to the literature in many ways. First, it confirms the existence of a 
negative relationship between EP and the cost of debt in Europe, whereas most of the studies 
had been focused in the U.S. (e.g. Schneider, 2010; Bauer and Hann, 2010; Chava, 2014). 
Second, it provides evidence that EP have incremental explanatory power on the cost of debt 
financing when controlling for the social and governance performances. Earlier literature 
describes the relationship between the ESG factors and the cost of debt financing but does not 
provide a detailed description of the effects of each of the ESG factors on the cost of debt 
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financing (Goss and Roberts, 2009). Lastly, this paper examines the strength of the 
relationship across bonds maturity, which has never been previously investigated.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework and the theory used 
to explain the relationship between the EP and the cost of debt financing. Section 3 provides 
a description of the finding of the recent literature on this topic. Section 4 provides 
background for further hypothesis formulation and formulates hypotheses. Section 5 
describes the data sample and the methodology used to test the different hypotheses. Section 
6 shows the empirical evidence. Section 7 explains the tests performed to ensure the 
robustness of the results. Section 8 discusses alternative explanation. Section 9 summarizes 
the results and discusses the potential limitations. 
2. Theory  
 Firms’ cost of debt financing is influenced by the default risk on their bonds. This 
default risk is the probability that the firms do not pay back entirely the principal or the 
interests on a bond and mainly depends on the uncertainty of their futures activities (Orlitzky 
and Benjamin, 2001). Therefore, the EP can influence firms’ cost of debt financing if it 
influences their default risk. 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) argue that EP affects the riskiness of firms in different 
ways. First, firms have an environmental liability, damages to the environment caused by a 
firm can give rise to substantial clean-up costs, increasing tail risk (Husted, 2005).  Second, 
EP also influences the reputational risk. Customers and investors can turn away from a brand 
due to firms’ involvement in environmentally irresponsible practice (Garber and Hammitt, 
1998). Third, regulatory risk is also impacted by EP as firms have to make investment to 
comply to new regulation (Testa, Iraldo, Frey, 2011). By mitigating clean-up cost, 
reputational and regulatory risks, the EP decreases the risk premium paid on bonds. 
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Prior literature already investigated the relationship between those risk and the cost of 
debt. Barth and McNichols (1994) found that environmental liabilities, which is a clean-up 
cost risk, have incremental explanatory power to recognized liabilities and assets in 
determining the equity value of a firm and Graham and Maher (2006) reports that both bond 
yields and ratings are influenced by firm’s potential environmental liability. Other studies also 
found that debt market takes into consideration the potential impact of the environmental 
liability on borrowers’ solvency (Pitchford, 2001; Boyer and Laffont, 1995; Heyes, 1996; 
Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). Regarding the reputation risk, Albuquerque, Durnev and 
Koskinen (2014) found that firms with better CSR performances show lower risk due to a 
higher customer loyalty. The literature is sparser when it comes to the regulatory risk as it is 
difficult to measure.  
To conclude, I explain the negative relationship between the cost of debt financing and the 
EP through lower risks. Indeed, firms with strong EP will have lower clean-up cost, 
reputational and regulatory risks, leading to lower default risks and hence to lower risk 
premium on their bonds.  
3. Recent literature 
Previous studies on the relationship between environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing mainly proxied environmental management using two databases: The Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI), which requires firms to release toxic chemicals above a certain 
threshold, and Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., Inc (KLD), a financial advisor providing 
social screening of firms to clients through its reports and socially screened mutual funds.   
Using the KLD database to screen firms showing concerns in terms of hazardous 
chemical, substantial emissions, and climate change, Chava (2014) shows that firms with 
these environmental concerns are charged a higher interest rate on bank loans and have lower 
institutional ownership in the United States. He found that a firm with environmental 
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concerns in all categories of the KLD database pays 25 basis point more per annum than a 
firm that has no environmental concerns. Goss and Roberts (2009) also uses the KLD 
database to examine the relationship between CSR performance and a sample of bank loans 
to U.S. firms. They found a 5 to 11 basis points lower risk premium for best CSR performer 
but argue that the difference is not economically significant.  Bauer and Hann (2010) 
investigate the relationship between the credit risk and firms’ environmental management 
using the KLD database. They find that in the US market, EP is negatively related to cost of 
debt and positively related to credit rating. Moreover, they find that this relationship has 
strengthened over the last decade. They report a maximum reduction of 64 basis points per 
annum. Schneider (2010) uses the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) to assess firms’ 
environmental management in the pulp and paper or chemicals industry in the United States. 
He finds respectively a 10.98 and 11.34 basis points increase per pound of toxic chemicals 
released for the pulp and paper and chemical industries, with an average of 2.86 pounds of 
toxic chemicals releases. However, TRI data had been criticized for, among other things, 
inaccuracy in firm reporting (Toffel and Marshall, 2004). Sharfman and Fernando (2008), on 
the other hand, investigated the relationship between the firms’ EP and weighted average cost 
of capital in the US market using both TRI and KLD database and found a 5-basis point 
increase in the firms’ cost of debt financing with better environmental risk management. 
However, they attribute this increase to an increase in leverage.  
In addition to these two datasets, Chen and Gao (2012) use carbon emission rates from 
the Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated Database (EGRID), issued by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, to test whether corporate climate risk was priced in the 
capital markets for the U.S. electric company. They conclude that the cost of equity and the 
cost of debt increases with the level of exposure to climate risk. 
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The literature is sparse when it comes to the relationship between the environmental 
management and the cost of debt financing outside the United States. Clarkson et al (2014) 
uses a voluntary Carbon Emissions survey to test the relationship between firms’ exposure to 
carbon-related risk and cost of debt in Australia. They find a 73 basis point increase in the 
cost of debt per 1 standard deviation increase in the carbon-related risk.  
Other studies also observe that the Chinese financial market reacts weakly on 
environmental news (Xu, Zeng and Tam, 2011). Using the Asset4 database, Feng et al (2015) 
found a decrease in the cost of equity for firms with better CSR management in North 
America, Europe and Africa. However, there was no such relationship in Asia. 
 To conclude, most of the previous literature has found a negative relationship between 
the cost of debt financing and the EP in the United States. However, mixed results have been 
found outside of the U.S., indicating that the strength relationship depends on the region in 
question. 
4. Hypothesis Development 
Building on the previous literature, this section formulates hypothesis about the 
relationship between EP and the cost of debt financing. If these hypotheses are true 
empirically, there is a relationship between the two factors. Moreover, testing these 
hypotheses will also prove that EP influences the cost of debt by reducing firms’ riskiness. 
4.1. Environmental management 
 As explained in the previous section, firms with strong EP will have lower clean-up 
cost, reputational and regulatory risks, leading to lower default risks and hence to lower risk 
premium on their bonds. 
“Hypothesis 1: Firms with better EP will incur a lower cost of debt financing”. 
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4.2. Time to maturity 
Earlier literature has already shown that the time to maturity has a positive relationship 
with the cost of debt financing (Chava, 2014; Bauer and Hann, 2010). The concern here is 
different; I will be examining the relationship between the cost of debt financing and the 
environmental factors across bonds time to maturity. 
Bonds with longer time to maturity present higher interest and business risk (Chen et al., 
2007). In particular, the longer the maturity, the higher the probability of environmental 
scandals. Therefore, reducing those risks should therefore be more beneficial for bonds with 
higher maturity.  
“Hypothesis 2: The negative relationship between EP and the cost of debt financing is 
stronger for bonds with a longer maturity.” 
4.3. High-risk Industries 
Barth and McNichols (1994) found that firms listed as potentially responsible parties for 
Superfund liabilities had an implicit environmental liability, which they concluded was 
incremental to the one already existing in the balance sheet. The literature also found that 
those firms had lower bonds ratings and higher yields. (Graham, Maher, and Northcut ,2001; 
Graham and Maher, 2006). There is therefore a misreported environmental liability that 
influences the bond yield and rating. As practices and environmental risk vary across 
industries, the misreported environmental liability may also differ across industries.  
Another possible source of differences across industries is legislation. Schneider (2010) 
suggested that some industries were more affected than other by the Toxic Release Inventory. 
In particular, he found that the cost of debt of firms operating in the chemicals and pulp and 
paper industries was influenced by the EP. Bauer and Hann (2010) also found that firm in the 
pulp and paper industry were penalized at a higher rate for environmental concerns.  
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“Hypothesis 3: Firms in certain industries will show a stronger relationship between 
environmental management and the cost of debt financing”. 
5. Methodology 
5.1. ESG Performance Data 
I extracted the ESG scores from Thomas Reuteurs Eikon ESG Database. Eikon is a 
software launched in 2010 giving access to several databases from Thomas Reuters, 
including bonds, equity and ESG data. Thomas Reuteurs is a firm that provides intelligence, 
technology and human expertise to professionals in the financial market. Their ESG database 
covers over 6000 public companies all over the world. Thomas Reuters has data on 
environmental, social and governance performances and issues scores each year for each 
category based on annual reports, company websites, NGO websites, stock exchange filings, 
CSR reports and news sources. The exact definitions of the ESG scores and their 
decompositions are described in table 1 in the Appendix. Each score ranges from 0 to 100 
and is relative to peers in the industry.  
5.2. Credit Risk Data 
I use two different risk measures to assert the importance of EP for investors in the 
bond market: the spread between the yield to maturity of bonds and the yield to maturity of 
the corresponding government bonds of the same maturity and the credit rating of the issuer 
issued by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. 
The spread between the offering yield to maturity of bonds and the yield to maturity 
of the corresponding government bonds of the same maturity is the first independent variable 
and proxy for the cost of debt financing. As this cost of debt is a value from the market, the 
spread represents the premium that investors in the bond market charge to compensate for the 
default risk of the bond. I use the natural logarithm form due to the positive skewness in the 
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yield to maturity distribution. (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Chava, 2014; Goss and Roberts, 
2009).  The second independent variable of this paper is the long-term Bond Issuer credit 
rating, which takes the value 1 for firms rated AAA, 2 for AA+ and so on. 
The necessary information was collected on Thomas Reuters Eikon and Bloomberg. 
Bloomberg is a private company who provides financial software, data, and media services. 
Their database covers 35 million instruments across all asset classes traded in more than 330 
exchanges. Some screens have been performed in order to obtain to accurate data.  
First, only firms whose countries of incorporation were Australia, Japan or in the 
Europe that traded respectively in the ASX200, Nikkei 225 and EuroStoxx600 were included. 
Firms operating in financial industries (Banking, life insurance, property and casualty 
insurance, securities and financial other) were excluded. I focus on corporate bonds with 
fixed coupons payment and classified as senior or junior unsecured. Finally bonds whose 
maturity was longer than 50 years were excluded.  
After matching the ESG data with the different control variables, there remains 1377 
bonds from 138 firms between the 1st January 2010 and the 31st December 2016.  
5.3. Control Variables 
5.3.1. Financial control variable 
This section reviews variables included in order to control for differences in firm 
characteristics that could also impact the cost of debt financing. This is in line with earlier 
studies which identify determinants of the cost of debt financing. (Bharath et al., 2008; Gray 
et al., 2009; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Schneider, 2011; Bauer and Hann, 2010, Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2006; Clarkson et al., 2014; Bradley, Chen, Dallas, and Snyderwine, 2008; 
Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Sharfman and Fernando, 2010; Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007; 
Chen and Gao, 2012). Table 2 in the Appendix summarizes the different control variables 
and their expected correlation with the cost of debt financing. Firm_Size is defined as the 
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natural logarithm of the value of firms’ total asset. Larger firms are likely to have access to 
more and cheaper debt. Moreover, large firms have a larger equity buffer which decreases 
their vulnerability to negative shocks (Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan, 2001). Some 
reputation effects also increase with firm size (Diamond, 1991). Therefore, I expect larger 
firm to have a lower cost of debt financing. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities 
on total assets. A higher level of liabilities or debt increases the probability of default. I 
expect firm with higher leverage to have a higher cost of debt financing. A dummy variable 
Loss that equals one when the firm’s net income before extraordinary items is negative in the 
current and prior year to the issue of the bond is included. As losses and profit tend to be 
persistent (Hayn, 1995), I expect the coefficient of the variable Loss to be positive. CapInt, 
IntCov and ROA are respectively defined as the net income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets, EBITDA divided by interest expense and the ratio of fixed asset on 
total asset. Earlier studies have shown that those variables were positively related to the credit 
ratings of the firms, as they are signs of financial strength (Gray et al., 2009). I expect those 
variables to have a negative relationship with the cost of debt financing. VOL is defined as 
the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the returns during the year prior the issue of 
the bond. Campbell and Taksler (2003) showed that firms with more volatile equity had a 
higher default probability. I expect VOL to show a positive relationship with the cost of debt 
financing. M_t_B corresponds to the ratio of the Market value of equity and the Book value 
of equity. Firms with higher market-to-book ratio show a higher risk as it represents higher 
expectation for the future (Pennman, 2006). Therefore, I expect higher market-to-book ratio 
to lead to higher cost of debt financing. I also included the firms’ 5-year Beta and Return_t1, 
defined as the returns on the stock of the firm in the month prior to the bond issue. As beta is 
the systematic risk of a firm, a higher beta will imply a higher risk. I predict the sign of the 
beta coefficient to be positive. Return_t1 is defined as the returns on the stock of the firm the 
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month prior to the bond issue. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) argued that the past stock 
return is a significant predictor of the expected return on the stock. As a stock expected return 
is positively correlated with its risk, I expect the past returns to have a positive relationship 
with the cost of debt financing. Lastly, Institutional Ownership has an influence on the cost of 
capital through a reduction of information asymmetries. (Lev and Nissim, 2003). As 
institutional investors exert influence on the board and even attend some meetings, they can 
ensure that managers do not make decisions in their interests instead of the interest of the 
firm. By reducing the agency cost, institutional investors should therefore lower the external 
cost of funding. When it comes to the cost of debt however, this relationship might not hold 
due to wealth transfers between equity and debt (Wang and Zhang, 2009). Therefore, I have 
no expectations about the coefficient of the institutional ownership variable. 
In addition to firm characteristics, I control for bonds characteristic to mitigate 
potential endogeneity problems. Issue_Size corresponds to the amount issued by the firm 
through the bond. Larger issues are more liquid and thus incur a lower yield spread (Ortiz-
Molina, 2006). I therefore expect the effect of Issue_Size on cost of debt financing to be 
negative. Maturity_Years is defined as the number of years before the bonds reach their 
maturity. Chen et al. (2007) argues that bonds with shorter maturity show higher liquidity and 
hence incur a lower cost of debt financing. Furthermore, the interest-rate risk and business 
risk is higher with longer maturity bonds. However, Schneider (2011) also argues that bonds 
with different maturities can attract different investors and then behave differently. Therefore, 
I have no expectations about the influence of years to maturity on the cost of debt financing. 
Callable_Dummy and Puttable_Dummy are respectively variables that equal one when the 
bonds are callable or puttable. I expect the coefficient of Puttable_Dummy and 
Callable_Dummy to be respectively negative and positive. Speculative is a variable that 
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equals to one when the bond issuer has a non-investment rating. I expect that the coefficient 
of Speculative to be positive because of lower liquidity.  
5.3.2. Social and Governance Performance 
Corporate governance is “concerned with the resolution of collective action problems 
among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various 
corporate claimholders” (Becht, Bolton and Röell, 2005). Corporate governance broadly 
defined and its relationship with the cost of debt financing has been the topic of earlier 
studies (Sengupta, 1998; Anderson et al.,2004; Cremers et al, 2007; Klock et al. 2005, Yu 
2005; Bradley et al, 2008; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003).  
Theoretically, there are two channels through which corporate governance can have an 
impact on the cost of debt financing: Agency risk and information risk.  
Agency risk represents the possibility that management acts in its own interests and make 
decision that do not maximize shareholder value. This agency cost takes the form of wealth 
expropriation (Jensen and Meckling 1976), short-term bias (Dechow and Sloan, 1991) and 
unprofitable investment to increase the size of the firm (Murphy, 1985). 
Information risk is the possibility that managers do not disclose information that would 
increase the probability of default of the bond. Investors are unable to properly assess 
properly the risk that they are exposed to in buying the bond. Good corporate governance 
mitigates this risk by requiring firms to disclose all required information when it comes due.  
Good corporate governance enables management of information and agency risk, thereby 
reducing the risk premium of bonds. 
Social performance comprises a wide range of factors including workforce satisfaction, 
workforce diversity and equal opportunities, human rights, public health, citizenship and 
product quality. Oikonomou et al (2014) suggest that equivalent logic applies for 
environmental and social performance. Firms with lower social performance presents a 
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higher risk of social scandal that can trigger damages to reputation. Moreover, new social 
regulations can increase costs for firms that did not act proactively in that area. Finally, social 
incidents may lead to substantial legal costs. These higher risks will subsequently translate 
into a higher risk premium and cost of debt financing.  
5.4. Empirical method 
 In order to test the relationship between the cost of debt and the environmental 
management, I regress the EP measure of firms on their cost of debt financing. The regressions 
are as follows: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑣. 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛿 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +  
 The Ln(Spread) is defined earlier in the paper as the difference between the offering 
yield to maturity of bonds and the yield to maturity of the corresponding government bonds 
of the same maturity. I use three different EP measures: The ES, the three decompositions of 
the ES, and the decomposition of the ES in tercile and quartile.  
 The analysis using the ES allows to investigate incremental change in the EP. If the 
coefficient is significant, it means that the market values even small environmental 
differences across firms. This approach has two weakness. First, the ES is broadly defined 
and does not allow perception of whether the market values one aspect of the environmental 
management more than the other. Second, the absence of a significant coefficient does not 
mean absence of relationship as a change of one in the ES might be too small to be 
meaningful in the market.  
 To solve the first weakness, I use the decomposition of the ES (namely Emissions, 
Innovation and Resource use score) as independent variable. As those scores are more 
precisely defined, this approach gives more insight about what investors value most as EP. 
However, the 1-point change might still not be large enough for the market to notice. 
Therefore, I include the decomposition of the ES in tercile and quartiles as independent 
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variables. This approach shows the results of larger changes in EP and is therefore more 
likely to identify a potential relationship.  
 All the regressions include fixed year and industry effects (4-Digit GICS code) to rule 
out the influence of a particular year of industry on the cost of debt. Moreover, the robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level to take into account the potential correlation 
between bonds from the same firm (Abadie et al, 2017). 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 All the complete tables can be found in the Appendix. I have only included in the text 
the important part of the tables necessary for the understanding of this paper. 
 Summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2 (Table 1 is shown in the 
Appendix). Spread, Size, Issue Size and Volatility have been transformed to their non-
logarithm form for interpretation purposes. The credit risk variables are economically 
significant and similar to previous literature. Table 2 documents an average spread of 168 
basis points and an average credit rating of A-/A3. Spread also shows a relatively large 
variation with a Standard Deviation of 180 and a range of 1299.89 basis points. With regards 
to the credit ratings, the distribution is less volatile with a standard deviation of 2. 
Furthermore, the credit rating of the sample extends from AA/A2 to D and around 7% of the 
bonds have a speculative rating. The Beta is very close to 1, indicating that our sample is well 
diversified and the variance inflation factor (VIF) do not indicate multicollinearity (See Table 
3 in Appendix). 
Finally, one could notice that the ES average is higher than the social and governance 
score average while keeping a lower volatility than the two other categories. The range of the 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides a summary statistic of the dependent and independent variables for a sample of 
1377 bonds covering the 2007-2017 period. Spread, Size, Issue Size and Volatility have been 
transformed back to their non-logarithm form for interpretation purpose. Spread is the yield to 
maturity at issue, defined as the difference between the yield to maturity of bond and the yield to 
maturity of the corresponding government bonds of the same maturity. 
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
Environmental Performance 
Environmental Score 1377 76.83 11.52 28.57 96.72 
Emissions Score 1377 77.45 16.95 20.37 99.56 
Resource use Score 1377 80.81 14.62 14.28 99.79 
Innovation Score 1377 72.22 22.23 0.38 99.57 
Social Performance 
Social Score 1377 70.33 16.29 17.18 96.31 
Workforce Score 1377 76.14 19.17 12.5 99.79 
Human Rights Score 1377 65.29 33.38 0 99.57 
Community Score 1377 60.67 28.93 2.94 99.79 
Product Responsibility 1377 71.29 23.77 4.16 99.74 
Governance Performance 
Governance Score 1377 58.68 19.76 10.69 96.85 
Management Score 1377 56.48 28.08 1.06 99.63 
Shareholders 1377 54.03 29.21 0.35 99.14 
CSR strategy 1377 75.21 18.15 0.364 99.75 
Credit Risk Variables 
Spread (bp) 1377 168 180 1.1 1300 
Credit Rating 1377 7.49 2.01 3 12 
Firms Control Variables 
Leverage 1377 0.69 0.12 0.04 1.26 
Size (In BM$) 1377 76,2 72,1 1.68 438 
Capital Intensity 1377 0,29 0.20 0 1.02 
Interest Coverage 1377 19.73 54.10 -188.2 1269.93 
ROA 1377 0,32 0.036 -0.16 0.33 
Loss 1377 0.023 0.15 0 1 
Beta 1377 0.99 0.29 0.23 1.80 
Institution Ownership (%) 1377 46.84 19.47 0.095 98.74 
Market-to-Book  1377 1,52 5.60 -92.42 29,93 
Volatility 1-year prior issue 1349 0.58 0.34   
Return 1-month prior issue 1350 0.007 0.07 -0.26 0.33 
Speculative 1377 0.0646 0.249 0 1 
Bonds Control variable 
Time to Maturity (in years) 1377 8.29 6.86 0.1111 50 
Issue Size (BM$) 1377 1,3 2.4 0.0198 449 
Callable 1377 0.087 0.28 0 1 
Puttable 1377 0.0007 0.03 0 1 
Seniority 1377 0.053 0.224 0 1 
Country  
Australia 1377 0.024 0.15 0 1 
Japan 1377 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Europe 1377 0.58 0.49 0 1 
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6.2. The cost of debt and the environmental management 
This section examines the general relationship between the cost of debt financing and the 
EP using the model outlined in the methodology section.  
First, this paper looks at the ESG combined score to see if those scores have any power in 
predicting the cost of debt financing. The first regression of Table 3 indicates that this is not 
the case. This could be due to an absence of correlation between the variables or because the 
three ESG factors put together blur the relationship.  
In order to test which possibility prevails, Column 2 presents the regression between the 
each ESG factors separately and the cost of debt financing. One could observe that only the 
coefficient of the ES is statistically significant, indicating a negative relationship between the 
two variables. On average, one-point increase in the ES decreases the cost of debt financing by 
0.0199%. Using the mean Spread as reference, that corresponds to less than one basis point 
decrease on the spread paid. As the ES ranges from 28.57 to 96.72, the maximum effect 
corresponds to a 1,356% reduction or 2.27 basis point reduction. This effect is modest and 
comparable to the reduction in cost of debt financing found by Goss and Roberts (2009). 
Surprisingly, the social and governance performances are not significant even though their 
coefficients have the predicted sign.  
Once again, I divided the ESG factors into their subsections in order to understand which 
parts carry the relationship. Regression (3) shows that the Innovation and Emissions 
performance drive the ES coefficient significantly. A possible explanation is that Greenhouse 
gas emissions have been a long-known environmental concern, the database about firms’ 
emissions are easily accessible and give a simple picture of the pollution emitted by the firm. 
The Innovation score importance can be related to the proactive environmental practice. 
Indeed, by innovating continuously, firms can gain competitive advantage and increase firm 
performance (Torusga et al, 2013). Furthermore, this decomposition shows further that 
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governance and social performance do not influence the cost of debt.  Even though only the ES 
seems to be correlated with the cost of debt financing even for a 1-point score change, this 
might not be the case for larger differences in scores.  
Table 3: Relationship between EP and the cost of debt 
This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of debt 
financing. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of a bond and the corresponding 
government rate of the same maturity on the environmental management measure and an array of control 
variables. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the 
firm level. (1) uses the ESG combined scores. (2) uses the decomposition of the ESG combined scores. (3) 
uses the decomposition of the each ESG scores. (4) sorts the firms in terciles according to their ESG scores. 
(5) sorts the firms in quartiles according to ESG scores. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the 
coefficient. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient.   * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
ESGCombinedSc -0.0000655 
(0.184) 
    
Environmental_Sc  -0.000199*** 
(0.002) 
   
Social_Score  -0.0000261    
  (0.683)    
Governance_Sc  -0.0000365    
  (0.301)    
Emissions_Score   -0.0000812*   
   (0.066)   
Innovation_Scor   -0.000107***   
   (0.004)   
Resourceuse_Sc   0.00000490   
   (0.932)   
Workforce_Scor   -0.0000232   
   (0.581)   
HumanRights_S   0.00000295   
   (0.895)   
Community_Sc   -0.0000370   
   (0.233)   
ProductResp_Sc   0.0000295   
   (0.324)   
Management_Sc   -0.0000131   
   (0.688)   
Shareholders_Sc   -0.0000113   
   (0.724)   
CSRStrategy_Sc   -0.0000224   
   (0.581)   
Env_Ter2    -0.00242  
    (0.119)  
Env_Ter3    -0.00387**  
    (0.031)  
Soc_Ter2    -0.00177  
    (0.340)  
Soc_Ter3    -0.000865  
    (0.721)  
Gov_Ter2    -0.00357**  
    (0.027)  
Gov_Ter3    -0.00281*  
    (0.081)  
Env_Quart2     -0.00128 
     (0.557) 
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Env_Quart3     -0.00548*** 
     (0.004) 
Env_Quart4     -0.00674*** 
     (0.001) 
Soc_Quart2     -0.00104 
     (0.558) 
Soc_Quart3     -0.00292 
     (0.242) 
Soc_Quart4     -0.0000220 
     (0.994) 
Gov_Quart2     -0.00380* 
     (0.052) 
Gov_Quart3     -0.00227 
     (0.255) 
Gov_Quart4     -0.00247 
     (0.217) 
Maturity_Years 0.000844*** 0.000820*** 0.000814*** 0.000835*** 0.000826*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issue_Size 0.000156 0.000103 0.0000883 0.000151 0.0000245 
 (0.859) (0.907) (0.916) (0.863) (0.977) 
Callable_Dumm 0.00716* 0.00718* 0.00749* 0.00752* 0.00699* 
 (0.076) (0.071) (0.055) (0.060) (0.081) 
 (0.801) (0.766) (0.484) (0.798) (0.714) 
Putable_Dummy 0.0198 0.0201* 0.0199* 0.0197* 0.0220* 
 (0.106) (0.086) (0.076) (0.089) (0.059) 
Speculative 0.0142*** 0.0121*** 0.0124*** 0.0128*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) 
Firm_Size 0.00336*** 0.00411*** 0.00411*** 0.00391*** 0.00396*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Credit_Rating 0.00221*** 0.00216*** 0.00224*** 0.00220*** 0.00233*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lev -0.00147 -0.00163 -0.00361 -0.00245 -0.00258 
 (0.854) (0.840) (0.663) (0.759) (0.754) 
CapInt 0.00356 0.00289 0.00184 0.00257 0.00379 
 (0.358) (0.498) (0.679) (0.518) (0.402) 
Loss 0.00782** 0.00783** 0.00737** 0.00725** 0.00739** 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.041) (0.047) (0.046) 
ROA 0.0316 0.0299 0.0268 0.0266 0.0245 
 (0.185) (0.192) (0.244) (0.245) (0.265) 
IntCov 0.00000335 0.00000472 0.0000037 0.00000682 0.00000649 
 (0.581) (0.434) (0.522) (0.288) (0.304) 
VOL 0.00259 0.00308 0.00326 0.00358 0.00281 
 (0.446) (0.331) (0.257) (0.239) (0.338) 
M_t_B -0.000173* -0.000170* -0.000163 -0.000209** -0.000197** 
 (0.054) (0.070) (0.136) (0.027) (0.037) 
Return_t1 0.00154 0.000152 0.000513 0.000567 -0.000331 
 (0.814) (0.981) (0.931) (0.929) (0.960) 
Beta -0.00655* -0.00465 -0.00457 -0.00582 -0.00457 
 (0.098) (0.219) (0.244) (0.130) (0.210) 
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000415 0.0000549* 0.0000515* 0.0000529* 0.0000723** 
 (0.187) (0.065) (0.090) (0.088) (0.018) 
Australia 0.0422*** 0.0442*** 0.0439*** 0.0450*** 0.0440*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Europe 0.00364 0.00414 0.00422 0.00431 0.00310 
 (0.18) (0.419) (0.264) (0.150) (0.410) 
_cons -0.0773** -0.0787** -0.0775** -0.0849*** -0.0868*** 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) 
R2 0.375 0.387 0.394 0.388 0.401 
N 1348 1348 1348 1348 1348 
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 In order to verify the evolution of the relationship as the difference in scores increases, 
Regression (4) and (5) uses dummy variables that take the value 1 when the bond issuer belongs 
in the corresponding tercile or quartile respectively. Tercile and Quartile 1, the base in this 
regression, are the worst environmentally performing firms. The benefit from higher EP seems 
to be concentrated at the upper level of the distribution. Indeed, bonds whose issuers have an 
ES in the highest tercile pay on average 0.387% less for their debt financing than the one at the 
lowest tercile. While social scores do not show relationship with the cost of debt financing, 
firms with better governance performance pay less on their debt than those at the bottom of the 
governance score distribution. However, this effect disappears somewhat with quartiles 
decomposition.  
 Regarding the general validity of the model, the R-squared of about 40% is lower than in 
the literature but still satisfying for such a diversified sample (See Chava (2014) and Bauer and 
Hann (2010) for comparison) and most of control variables show the predicted sign. Time to 
Maturity appears to have a positive correlation with the risk premium, which could be a sign 
of lower liquidity and higher interest and business risk for longer maturities bonds. The natural 
logarithm of the asset value Firm size shows a positive relationship with the cost of debt 
financing, contrary to what was expected. A 1% increase in the size of the assets increases the 
spread by around 0,004%. A possible explanation for this counter-intuitive result is that bigger 
firms take on more leverage in this sample. Loss, Speculative, Credit_Rating and 
Putable_Dummy all have a positive influence on the Spread as expected. The institutional 
Ownership has a positive relationship with the cost of debt financing when decomposing the 
ESG performances in quartiles. However, this relationship is not economically significant as 
one additional percent in the Institutional Ownership increases by 0.007% the cost of debt 
financing (the whole range does not even reach 0.1% increase). The same logic goes for the 
Market-to-Book ratio. Australia shows a higher level of Spread, which could also be explained 
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by the relative small size of the Australian bonds sample or the more illiquid character of the 
bond market in Australia.  
To conclude, Table 3 supports hypothesis 1. ES has incremental power to explain the cost 
of debt financing when controlling for firms characteristic and social and governance 
performance. Furthermore, most of the relationship is carried by the Emissions and the 
Innovation score. Table 3 also indicates that most of the benefit are concentrated in the upper 
half of the ES distribution. However, the magnitude of the spread reduction is probably not 
economically significant.  
6.3. The cost of debt and the environmental management across different maturities 
The previous sections showed that there is a relationship between the cost of debt and the 
EP on the whole sample. However, this paper also argues that the relationship between the 
cost of debt financing and the EP is stronger for bonds with longer maturity due to the clean-
up costs, reputational loss, regulatory pressures and the potential risk of climate change. In 
order to investigate this hypothesis, the dataset has been divided into 4 sub-datasets: (1) 
Bonds with a maturity of less than 3 years, (2) bonds with a maturity between 3 and 5 years, 
(3) bonds with a maturity between 5 and 10 years and (4) bonds with maturity longer than 10 
years. 
First, I investigate the general relation between the cost of debt financing and the ESG 
combined score across bonds maturity in Table 4. This table gives little support for 
hypothesis 2. Although the relationship between ESG and cost of debt financing becomes 
more negative as maturities increase, the coefficients for bonds with time to maturity higher 
than 3 years are not significant and the coefficient for bonds with a maturity lower than 3 
years is positive. As in the previous section, possible interaction between the components of 




Table 4, 5, 6 and 7: Relationship between EP and the cost of debt across maturities 
This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing across maturities. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of 
a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the environmental 
management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. This table uses the ESG combined 
scores. The dataset has been divided into 4 sub-datasets: (1) Bonds with a maturity of lES than 3 
years, (2) bonds with a maturity between 3 and 5 years, (3) bonds with a maturity between 5 and 10 
years and (4) bonds with maturity longer than 10 years. P-value are reported in the parenthesis 
below the coefficient. The control variables are not displayed. 
  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
ESGCombined 0.000180*** -0.000109 -0.0000290 -0.000133 
 (0.009) (0.386) (0.612) (0.109) 
R2 0.835 0.600 0.489 0.354 
N 218 120 551 459 
Environmental_Score -0.0000286 0.0000869 -0.000312*** -0.000185** 
 (0.812) (0.669) (0.001) (0.023) 
Social_Score -0.00000975 -0.0000274 0.0000293 -0.0000771 
 (0.915) (0.834) (0.568) (0.389) 
Governance_Score -0.0000459 -0.0000128 0.0000435 -0.000162** 
 (0.315) (0.902) (0.300) (0.018) 
R2 0.814 0.598 0.519 0.375 
N 218 120 551 459 
Emissions_Score 0.000112 0.000125 -0.000147*** -0.0000796 
 (0.175) (0.284) (0.004) (0.325) 
Innovation_Score -0.0000978 -0.0000616 -0.000145*** -0.0000471 
 (0.261) (0.597) (0.006) (0.150) 
Resourceuse_Score -0.000127 0.0000548 0.00000754 -0.0000815 
 (0.240) (0.730) (0.888) (0.270) 
R2 0.857 0.629 0.531 0.382 
N 218 120 551 459 
Env_Ter2 0.00237 0.00449 -0.00431** -0.00555*** 
 (0.281) (0.236) (0.039) (0.001) 
Env_Ter3 0.00444 -0.0000649 -0.00657** -0.00404* 
 (0.172) (0.987) (0.022) (0.086) 
Soc_Ter2 0.00164 0.00491 0.000565 -0.00555** 
 (0.732) (0.224) (0.754) (0.012) 
Soc_Ter3 0.000393 -0.00134 0.000183 -0.000162 
 (0.939) (0.822) (0.925) (0.959) 
Gov_Ter2 0.00375 0.00249 -0.000319 -0.00787*** 
 (0.139) (0.588) (0.850) (0.001) 
Gov_Ter3 -0.00408 0.000171 0.00105 -0.00762*** 
 (0.363) (0.975) (0.620) (0.006) 
R2 0.859 0.626 0.506 0.405 
N 218 120 551 459 
 
Table 4 confirms this hypothesis; the decomposition in separate ESG factors reveal the 
predicted pattern. As expected, there is no significant relationship between the environmental 
factor and the cost of debt financing for bonds with lower maturity (less than 5 years) while 
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the relationship becomes negative and significant for higher maturity bonds. The 
environmental risk seems to be priced only for longer than 5 years bonds maturity. The 
relationship is weaker for bonds with a maturity higher than 10 years, possibly indicating that 
the pricing of the environmental factor becomes more difficult for very long-term bonds. 
However, those results are still not impressive economically speaking. Another important 
feature of this table is the negative relationship between cost of debt financing and the 
governance performance for bonds longer than 10 years. A possible explanation is that 
investors think governance performance only brings benefit in the long-run.  
Moreover, Table 6 confirms that this relationship is carried by the Emissions and 
Innovation performance as in the previous section even though the relationship fades for 
bonds with a maturity longer than 10 years. No other score is significant at a 5% level. 
Interestingly, by decomposing the data into tercile, Table 7 reveals that the hypothesis 2 
actually works for the three ESG factors. For bonds with a maturity longer than 10 years, the 
upper and middle tercile of the ESG factors distribution pay less for their debt financing than 
the lower tercile. However, the EP is the only factor whose relationship with the cost of debt 
financing also holds for bonds with a maturity between 5 and 10 years. Once again, investors 
seem to think that the ESG factors are only important in the long-run. 
Finally, the general validity of the models appears to be good with r-squared between 
around 35% and 80%. A feature shared by the 4 tables is the progressive decrease in r-
squared as the bond maturities increases. This makes sense as the uncertainty about the risk 
and value of the bonds increase as maturity increases; the variables have a lesser power to 
explain its variation around the mean. Another interesting feature is the positive relationship 
between the cost of debt financing and the institutional ownership for bonds with maturity 
longer than 10 years. As explained earlier, by reducing the information asymmetries and 
agency costs, institutional ownership can reduce the cost of capital but wealth transfer 
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between equity and debt holder might lead to mixed results. Those results seem to indicate 
that bond markets believe that institutional investors have a long-term negative effect.  
Even though the results look convincing, one could argue that the lack of significance 
stems from the lower number of observations for bonds belonging in the 0 to 3 years and 3 to 
5 years maturity category. However, merging those two categories to have a comparable 
number of observations (as in the other categories) does not lead to different result, as could 
have been expected by the opposite sign of the coefficients in regression (1) and (2) in most 
tables.  
To conclude, this section provides support for hypothesis 2. The negative relationship 
between the EP and the cost of debt financing is stronger for bonds with more than 5 years 
maturity. Moreover, the relationship is also present at the upper level of the ESG score 
distribution for the three ESG factors. This may indicate that investors consider ESG factors 
as a long-term risk reducer.  
6.4. Relationship between environmental management across Industries  
 Earlier literature has shown that some industries might have a higher sensitivity to 
environmental factors (Cormier and Magnan,1997; Schneider, 2010; Bauer and Hann, 2010). 
However, firms in my sample have GICS classification while the industries risk classification 
has been performed using SIC. Therefore, I follow Bhojraj, Lee and Oler (2003) to translate 
SIC-2digits classification into GICS. Using Bauer and Hann (2010) classification, High_Risk 
is defined as a variable that takes the value one if the bonds issuer operates in one of the 
following industries: paper and allied products (SIC:2600; GICS: 151050), chemicals and 
allied products (SIC: 2800, 5160, 5161, 5169; GICS:151010, 351020), petroleum refining 
(SIC: 2910, 2911, 2900; GICS: 101020), primary metal (SIC: 3300; GICS : 151040), and 
mining (SIC: 1000, 1200; GICS: 151040).  
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As in the previous sections, I first investigate if the ESG factors combined have an 
influence on the cost of debt financing by decomposing the dataset. It can be observed from 
the first two regressions in table 8 that both risky and non-risky firms show a negative 
relationship between the cost of debt financing and the ESG scores combined but the risky 
industries show a stronger relationship However, regressions (3) and (4) show that those 
results are not robust when decomposing the ESG factors. Indeed, the EP is not statistically 
significant. There could be no additional explanatory power due to industry specifics risk in 
Europe, Japan and Australia. One possible explanation is the difference of legislation 
between the U.S., Europe, Japan and Australia. Indeed, Schneider (2010) based his industry 
identification on the fact that the U.S. introduces the Toxic Release Inventory which allows 
clear identification of the largest polluting facilities. Another explanation is the heterogeneity 
among risky industries blurred the results (Cormier and Magnan,1997; Schneider, 2010). 
This absence of relationship could also come from a lack of data. Another data 
decomposition could help prove the existence of a relationship or not. Therefore, I used 
terciles in regression (5) and (6) to further investigate the data sample. The regressions reveal 
that the higher part of the ES distribution pay less for its debt financing in both high-risk and 
non high-risk industry. However, this effect is stronger in the case of high-risk industry, 
giving some support to the hypothesis 3. 
To conclude, table 8 does not confirm entirely hypothesis 3. There is no significant 
relationship between the cost of debt financing and the environmental management for one-
point score change. However, the best environmentally performing firms pay less than the 
worst environmentally performing firms within risky industry. This effect exists as well for 
non-risky industry but is less strong. This pattern seems to indicate that there is more reward 
for having better environmental management in risky industries, but improvement is not 
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valued incrementally. Another point that could blur the relationship is the lack of data for 
risky industries. 
Table 8: Relationship between EP and the cost of debt across industries 
This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of debt 
financing across industries. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of a bond 
and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the environmental management measure 
and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The robust 
Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1), (3) and (5) use risky industries data while (2), (4) and 
(6) use the other industries data. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient.  * p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
ESGCombined -0.00022** -0.000086*     
 (0.021) (0.091)     
Environmental_Sc   -0.000153 -0.00018**   
   (0.293) (0.010)   
Social_Score   0.0000163 -0.0000301   
   (0.838) (0.660)   
Governance_Score   0.0000032 -0.000065*   
   (0.970) (0.066)   
Env_Ter2     0.00196 -0.00408** 
     (0.300) (0.017) 
Env_Ter3     -0.00748** -0.00408** 
     (0.014) (0.041) 
Soc_Ter2     -0.00292 -0.00160 
     (0.248) (0.375) 
Soc_Ter3     -0.00373 0.000307 
     (0.275) (0.898) 
Gov_Ter2     0.00454 -0.00424*** 
     (0.207) (0.010) 
Gov_Ter3     -0.000457 -0.00414*** 
     (0.868) (0.007) 
R2 0.827 0.380 0.812 0.392 0.839 0.398 
N 168 1182 168 1182 168 1182 
 
7. Robustness checks  
 The complete version of this section can be found in the Appendix. I present herein 
the results of the robustness checks as well as their purpose. First, the relationship between 
the cost of debt and the EP only exists in Europe. No sign of this relationship has been found 
in Japan. Dividing the sample according to country of incorporation or country of issue leads 
to the same results. 
  Second, if the ES influences the firms’ risk, it should also influence firms’ credit 
rating. This paper does not find evidence of such influence. There are two possible 
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explanations for this phenomenon: the EP does not influence the cost of debt through risk or 
the Credit Rating agencies do not take the EP fully into account.  
 Third, I examined the significance of each ESG factors. Their correlation is relatively 
large, indicating that not including any one the ESG factor could lead to bias. Moreover, the 
environmental and governance score has an impact of the bond yields. The social score does 
not have such impact. However, due to its correlation with the other ESG factors, its 
inclusion in the analysis is critical.  
 Fourth, Schneider (2010) stated that, as firms’ credit rating goes up, the importance of 
the EP in the bond pricing goes down. This paper finds the opposite. This effect is related to 
earlier findings of this paper. EP might not be fully considered by Credit Rating agencies.  
 Fifth, the results are robust to the inclusion of the ES from the year before and after 
the bond issue. This means that investors are using timely information in their bonds pricing. 
Moreover, this rule out the possibility of a reverse direction in the relationship. Indeed, if 
cheaper debt influenced the environmental management through easier access to capital, 
there would be a negative relationship between the cost of debt in the current period and the 
ES in the future period.  
 Sixth, to rule out endogeneity, I have performed a matched firm approach using the 
propensity score and Mahalanobis distance. I have also included firm fixed effect in the 
analysis. The results are robust to those different methodologies. 
Seventh, I document decreasing returns to environmental scores with respect to the reduction 
of cost of debt. Only the first tercile of the environmental scores demonstrated a significant 
relationship.  
 Lastly, clustering the standard errors at the industry or the sector level does not alter 





 The robustness checks have ruled out potential bias of this study. However, some 
alternatives theory could still explain or spur the results. 
 First, the ESG scores are issued once a year. Variations in the EP during the year is 
therefore not embedded in the scores. Moreover, how accurately the scores describe the ESG 
performance of the firm probably depends on the time difference between the ESG score 
update and the bond issue. The inaccuracies in reflecting the real ESG performance of the 
firms can spur the results. Second, this paper did not differentiate between intra-firm effect 
and sample effect. Indeed, there might be some difference between an improvement of the 
environmental factors at firm-level and at sample level. Third, investors may not be interested 
in the country of incorporation or country of bond issue but rather in the country from where 
the firm has most of its activities or revenues. If this is the case, the classification between 
Japan and Europe is biased and the results are not valid. Fourth, firms issuing bonds with 
different maturities may show differences. Those differences could influence the relationship 
between the cost of debt financing and the ES, spurring the results for hypothesis 2. Finally, 
there could also be an omitted variable bias even though the robustness checks tend to 
confirm that this is not the case. 
9. Conclusion 
 This paper presents detailed evidence of a negative relationship between the cost of 
debt and EP. Basing the research on the hypothesis that EP reduces clean-up costs, reputation 
and regulatory risks, I regress the ES issued by Thomas Reuters on the cost of debt financing. 
 First, I found a robust negative relationship between ES and the bond spread. This 
relationship is robust to estimation method, firm-fixed effect and the inclusion of past and 
future ES. However, the size of the effect is modest with a maximum reduction of 2.27 basis 
point. Those results are similar to those found by Goss and Roberts (2009). Second, this 
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relationship is stronger for longer maturities. In particular, the correlation could be observed 
only for bonds with a maturity longer than 5 years. This is explained by a larger 
environmental risk for longer maturity. Third, the relationship is not necessarily stronger in 
industries with environmental high-risk. However, the difference in Spread between the 
upper quartile and the lower quartile of the ES distribution is higher in those industries, 
suggesting that the market only values EP at its best. Fourth, the relationship between the cost 
of debt and EP only holds in Europe. This could come from difference in investors behaviour, 
legislation or difference in bond market. Finally, the relationship between the EP and the 
credit risk has not been confirmed. There is no particular relationship between the credit 
rating and the ES.  
 Those results have managerial implications. Investments to improve the EP of a firm 
can lead to a decrease in cost of debt – albeit they are modest. This is especially true if the 
firm issues long-term maturity bonds in Europe. Moreover, it only has a positive impact on 
credit rating for firms with a rating of BB+ or lower. Lastly, only the best quartile sees 
significant results in risky industries. By acknowledging those findings, managers can build a 
strategy to reduce firms’ cost of debt and ease their access to capital. 
 There are still a lot of unknowns about the relationship between the cost of debt and 
the environmental factors. Further studies should explore this relationship in other 
geographical areas. Emerging countries are particularly interesting in this regard as they show 
a higher level of risk. Other ESG scores could also be used. This would test if the results are 
robust to a different database. Finally, little is known about the impact of the EP on the cost 
of debt for smaller companies. Deeper understanding of the strength of the relationship in 
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This table summarizes the definition of the different ESG factors issued by Thomas Reuters. The first column 
indicates the category of the ESG score. The second column indicates the name of the score while the third 
reports their definition. The last column represents the percentages of the ESG score in the total ESG 
combined score. 
Category Score Variable % 
ES 
Resource use Score The Resource Use Score reflects a company’s 
performance and capacity to reduce the use of 
materials, energy or water, and to find more 
eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain 
management. 
11% 
Emissions Score The Emission Reduction Score measures a 
company’s commitment and effectiveness 
towards reducing environmental emission in the 
production and operational processes. 
12% 
Innovation Score The Innovation Score reflects a company’s 
capacity to reduce the environmental costs and 
burdens for its customers, thereby creating new 
market opportunities through new 




Workforce Score The Workforce Score measures a company’s 
effectiveness towards job satisfaction, a healthy 
and safe workplace, maintaining diversity and 
equal opportunities, and development 
opportunities for its workforce. 
16% 
Human Rights Score The Human Rights score measures a company’s 
effectiveness towards respecting the 
fundamental human rights conventions. 
4.5% 
Community Score The Community Score measures the company’s 
commitment towards being a good citizen, 
protecting public health and respecting business 
ethics. 
8% 
Product Responsibility Score The Product Responsibility Score reflects a 
company’s capacity to produce quality goods 
and services integrating the customer’s health 




Management Score The Management Score measures a company’s 
commitment and effectiveness towards 
following best practice corporate governance 
principles 
19% 
Shareholders Score The Shareholders Score measures a company’s 
effectiveness towards equal treatment of 
shareholders and the use of anti-takeover 
devices. 
7% 
CSR Strategy Score The CSR Strategy Score reflects a company’s 
practices to communicate that it integrates the 
economic (financial), social and environmental 
dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making 
processes. 
4.5% 





This table documents the different abbreviation of the variables used in the analysis, their 
descriptions and the expected correlation with the cost of debt financing. The ESG scores 




ESG Performance Variables 
Env_Ter3/Env_Quart4 
Tercile/Quartile regrouping the best 
environmentally performing firms. The worst 
being in Env_Ter1/Env_Quart1 
- 
Soc_Ter3/Soc_Quart4 
Tercile/Quartile regrouping the best socially 




Tercile/Quartile regrouping the worst 
environmentally performing firms. The best 
being in Env_Ter4/Env_Quart4 
- 
Control Variables 
Maturity_Years Time to maturity in years ? 
Issue_Size Amount issued by the firm through the bond - 
Callable_Dummy Equal to 1 when the bond is callable  + 
Seniority_Dummy Equal to 1 when the bond is Senior Unsecured  - 
Puttable_Dummy Equal to 1 when the bond is puttable  - 
Speculative 
Equal to 1 when the rating of the bond issuer 
is lower than BBB- or Baa 
+ 
Firm_Size Natural logarithm of the asset of the firm - 
Lev 








Equal to 1 when the firm has negative net 
profit in either of the past two years 
+ 
ROA 
Return on Assets, net income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets 
- 
IntCov 




Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of 








Returns on the stock of the firm the month 
before the bond issue 
+ 
Beta 













This table summarizes the Variance Inflation Analysis for each 
variable. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Europe 5.74 0.174221 
Issue_Size 4.45 0.224796 
Firm_Size 3.17 0.315318 
Credit_Rat~g 3.09 0.323713 
Beta 2.89 0.345668 
Social_Score 2.41 0.414984 
VOL 2.37 0.421418 
Seniority_~y 2.20 0.454794 
ROA 2.12 0.472642 
Speculative 1.93 0.519148 
Lev 1.84 0.542627 
CapInt 1.60 0.624351 
Governance~e 1.54 0.649388 
Inst_Own_Per 1.47 0.678134 
Maturity_Y~s 1.43 0.701457 
Callable_D~y 1.42 0.705191 
Environmen~e 1.42 0.705245 
M_t_B 1.32 0.756749 
Loss 1.24 0.803988 
IntCov 1.23 0.816215 
Return_t1 1.09 0.921160 
   




















11.2. Complete Robustness checks 
11.2.1. Regions 
If investors in different countries have different awareness of the importance of 
environmental management, the relationship between the cost of debt financing and the 
environmental management could differ from country to country. Xu et al. (2011) found that a 
negative environmental event has a weaker impact on firms’ market value in China, as 
compared with firms based in the United States. Capelle-Blancard and Lugna (2010) found 
some evidence that stock markets in continental Europe and Japan have higher sensibility to 
environmental hazard. Compared with the United States, they found that abnormal market 
losses the day after a chemical disaster are 1.25% and 1.8% higher in continental Europe in 
Japan respectively. Those differences in awareness could play a role in the incorporation of 
the environmental management into the pricing of the bonds.  
Another factor of variability across regions is legislation. Australia introduced a Carbon 
Price Mechanism in 2011. The CPM works as an emissions trading scheme and should therefore 
cap emissions (Subramaniam et al, 2013). Europe and Japan introduced a similar trade system 
in 2005 and in 2010 and plan to decrease the amount of emissions over time. The National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act was also introduced in 2007 in Australia. This act makes 
the disclosure of GHG emissions, energy consumption and production as well as other 
environmental information compulsory (Clarkson et al, 2014). Japan also introduced a larger 
framework called the Climate Change Countermeasure, aimed at reducing greenhouse gaz.  
Moreover, different regions also have different debt market. Alcock et al (2012) showed 
that the Australian market was small and illiquid and firms rely heavily on private debt 
(Cotter, 1998; Gray et al., 2009; Alcock et al., 2012). Japanese and European bond markets 
have also relied on private debt and relationship based lending more than the US (Batten and 
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Szilagyi, 2003; Gaspar, et al, 2002). Nevertheless, the European corporate public bonds 
market is growing fast (ECB, 2004).  
Due to the lack of data for Australian bonds, I focused on the differences between 
Japan and Europe. In order to investigate the difference in sensitivity between the two 
regions, I performed the same analysis as in the previous section after dividing the sample 
according to regions.  
First, regressions (1) and (2) in Table 9 suggests that the negative relationship 
between the cost of debt and the environmental performance is only significant for firms 
whose country of incorporation is in Europe. The governance score also seems to have a 
negative influence on the cost of debt in European countries.  
Second, decomposing the scores into their sub-score does not give more support to 
the importance of ESG factors in the Japanese bond market. Indeed, no sub-scores have any 
significant relationship with the cost of debt financing. Regarding European bonds, 
innovation score is the most important environmental factor while the Emission score is 
insignificant. This could be due to decreasing marginal returns on environmental investment 
as the emissions performance in Europe are already high. The significance of the governance 
score in the regression one comes from the negative relationship between the CSR strategy 
score and the management score, which are both negatively correlated with the cost of debt 
financing. 
Third, Table 10 confirms that there is probably no relationship between the cost of 
debt financing and the environmental performance in Japan. However, some relationship 
appears for European bonds. One could see that the lowest quartile of the environmental 
scores distribution pay more than the upper Quartiles. However, the decomposition in 
Terciles in regression (5) leads to no results. A possible explanation for those two 
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contradicting findings is that the bottom distribution is the one mostly affected by the 
environmental performance while the effect will be less strong for better performing firms. 
 
11.2.2. Credit rating 
This paper argues that the EP has a negative relationship with cost of debt financing 
through its influence on risk. If such a relationship exists, there should be a negative 
relationship between the EP and measures of firm risk.  
A reliable measure of long-term risk is the credit rating issued by credit rating agencies.  I 
have collected the firms credit rating issued by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. As 
explained in the Standard and Poor’s website, “Credit ratings are opinions about credit risk. 
Our ratings express our opinion about the ability and willingness of an issuer, such as a 
corporation or state or city government, to meet its financial obligations in full and on time” 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2017). I use those ratings as a proxy for firm risk. As EP decreases the 
clean-up, regulatory and reputational risks, I expected a positive correlation between ranking 
and credit rating.  
The model to test this hypothesis is as follows: 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑣. 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛿 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +  
The first credit rating measure used is a dummy variable that takes value of one when a firm’ 
rating is in the upper half rating of the sample and EPs measures, Credit_Rating_Half. Table 
11 shows the probit regressions between the EP and this credit measure.  
First, I investigate if there is any relationship between ESG factors and the credit 
ratings. If the risk-reducing channel is correct, then there should be a positive relationship 
between the EP and the credit rating. Regression (1) gives some support to that hypothesis 
and shows that when the EP increases, the likelihood of in the upper half of the credit 
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measure distribution increases too, suggesting a positive relationship between the ES and the 
credit rating.  
To further investigate the risk-reduction channel hypothesis, I decomposed the ESG 
scores in order to provide insights about the factors affecting the credit rating. If the risk 
channel is correct, the Emissions score and the Innovation performances are the one driven 
the relationship between the credit rating and the EP as those two factors are the ones 
carrying the relationship between ES and the cost of debt financing (See Table 2). Regression 
2 supports this hypothesis. Emissions and Innovation score have indeed a significant positive 
coefficient. 
Finally, regression (3) and (4) implies that this process is quite linear with respect to 
the ES. Indeed, the best performing quartile and tercile enjoy a higher likelihood to be in the 
upper half distribution of the Credit Rating. Those results are similar to those found with the 
cost of debt financing, giving further support to the risk-reduction channel. 
To conclude, I find a quasi linear positive relationship between the EP and the 
probability of being in the upper half distribution of the credit rating. The results found are 
similar what has been found with the relationship between the cost of debt and the ES. This 
gives support to the risk-reduction channel: EP reduces risks, which reduces the risk premium 
in the bond market.  
 Regarding potential risk-reduction channel through Social and Governance 
performance, Table 11 gives no further evidence. The Social Score shows a negative 
relationship with the credit rating quality and the Governance score does not show any 
statistically significant relationship. 
One of the problems with the previous analysis is the credit rating measure. As the 
variable only takes the value one if the bonds issuer is the upper half distribution of the credit 
rating, it is hard to examines any potential patterns within the credit rating distribution. 
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Therefore, I ran three different probit regressions and extracted the marginal effects. Table 12 
shows the marginal effects of the first probit regression. I run the a mulnomial probit across 
all the different credit rating besides the credit rating AA due to lack of observations. Table 
12 depicts the probability of an observation within each credit rating for a given change 
ceteris paribus. For example, holding everything constant, a bond with ES 1 point higher than 
another has a 0.0146 higher probability than the other bond to have the credit rating BBB+. 
Table 12 does not provide support for the risk-reduction channel. Indeed, an increase in the 
ES decrease the probability of the bonds issuer to have the credit rating A+, A or A- but 
increase its probability of having a rating BB+ or BBB-. This probit shows negative 
relationship between the credit rating and the ES. However, by breaking the sample in 9 
categories, some single firms may drive the results. In order to correct for this potential bias, I 
ran another regression using the classification of Schneider (2010) in Table 13. I sorted those 
bonds according to the Credit Rating of their issuer following the 3 categories described by 
Schneider: Low quality (BB+(Ba1) and lower), Medium quality (BBB- to BBB+ (Baa3 to 
Baa1)) and High quality (A-(A3) and higher). This table also suggests that increasing the ES 
decreases the probability of being the in High quality bonds while increasing the probability 
of being in the middle quality.  
To conclude, this section found that the environmental risk-reduction channel does 
not hold for the hold distribution. One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that there 
is some decrease in the risk by increasing the EP until some point. After this point, credit 
agencies do not value further investment as a risk reduction. Decomposition the credit rating 
sample into quartiles lead to similar results (not tabulated) 
11.2.3. Correlation and Relevance 
This section explains the reasons for the inclusion of the social and governance factors. 
First, I analyzed the correlation between the correlation between the ESG factors in order to 
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assess their relevance to explain the cost of debt of debt financing. Second, I examine if the 
social and governance scores have power in predicting the cost of debt financing or if they 
are just noise.  
Table 3 has shown that only the EP had an incremental power to explain the cost of debt 
financing. However, if the three ESG factors are correlated, the statistical significance of 
each factor could fade away. In order to provide more hindsight about the effects that 
correlation has on the significance of the ESG performance, a correlation matrix has been 
created. One can see that the correlation is relatively strong and could have an influence of 
the size of the coefficient of the variables.  
To check further if the correlation blurs potential relationship between a ESG factor and 
the cost of debt financing, Table 15 runs regressions between the each ESG factor alone and 
the Spread. EP is the only factor significant alone, supporting the relevance of this factor in 
explaining the cost of debt. One could also notice that the coefficient and the statistical 
significance of each factors are lower when put together, confirming the correlation.  
However, Table 15 does not confirm the significance of the social and governance factors 
to explain the cost of debt financing. In order to investigate this significance, I used the 
decomposition into terciles and quartiles of the two factors. The regressions 2 and 3 in table 
16 indicate that the social performance has little to no significant influence on the cost of 
debt. Regarding the governance performance, one could clearly see that better performing 
firms in terms of governance pay less on average on their debt. The first regression was 
included to be able to compare the adjusted r-squared. One could clearly see that both the 
social and the governance factor increase the r-squared significantly. 
To conclude, the governance performances has a significant and negative relationship 
with the cost of debt financing and is correlated with the EP. Therefore, it should be included 
in the analysis. The social performance has no significant relationship with the cost of debt 
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financing but is correlated with the EP too. It also increased the adjusted r-squared, indicating 
that it provides still some explanation of the variations of the cost of debt financing around its 
mean. Therefore, it is probably not irrelevant and should be included in the analysis. 
11.2.3. The relationship by Credit Rating Category 
Schneider (2010) found that as the quality of the bonds increases, the idiosyncratic 
default risk has fewer price effect, which would lead to lower relevance of the environmental 
risk in the bond pricing as the quality of the bonds increases. To establish the existence of 
this theory in Europe, Japan and Australia, I replicated its analysis with this sample. I sorted 
these bonds according to the Credit Rating of their issuer following the 3 categories described 
by Schneider: Low quality (BB+(Ba1) and lower), Medium quality (BBB- to BBB+ (Baa3 to 
Baa1)) and High quality (A-(A3) and higher). Table 17 shows the opposite of what Schneider 
found in the United States. Regressions (1), which uses bonds whose issuers have a rating 
higher than A- (A3), is the only regression where the ES is statistically significant and 
negative. This has several potential explanations. First, it could be that environmental risk in 
only priced correctly when the firms is not risky. This would be the case if the environmental 
risk is thought to be less prevalent than other risks for example. Its pricing only is effective 
when the other risks are low. Table 13 actually shows the progressive decrease in the 
coefficient value of the social score, which becomes negative for firm in the lower credit 
rating category. Following the explanation given, investors would value more social score 
than the environmental when the other risks are high but actually see the social performance 
as a cost when the other risks are low. Another potential explanation is endogeneity. A 
hidden variable such as environmental disclosure could be correlated with both the credit 
rating and the cost of debt. Finally, the first category is also the category with most of the 
observations, which increases its probability to display higher statistical significance 
compared to the other categories. 
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To conclude, this paper does not find the same evidence as Schneider. It actually found 
the opposite, the EP has a negative relationship with the cost of debt financing only for bond 
in the upper part of the credit rating distribution. This could from difference in investors 
behavior due to geographical or time difference.  
11.2.4. Country of Issue 
 
Section 7.5. showed in a regional analysis of the relationship between the ES and the cost of 
debt financing that this relationship only exists for bonds whose country of Incorporate is in 
Europe. However, the bond market reaction to environmental factors could vary not only 
according to the country of incorporation but also according to the country of Issue. To 
investigate this issue, I divided the sample between bond issued in Europe (Regression 1,3,5 
and 7) and bonds issued in Japan (Regressions 2,4,6 and 8) in Table 18. An analysis similar 
to the one in section 7.5. has been performed.  
 The two first equations show that investors have different behaviour in Europe and in 
Japan. There is a relationship between the environmental and the governance performance 
and the cost of debt financing in Europe while the social score shows a negative relationship 
in Japan. Table 9 indicated the same pattern for firms with European country of incorporation 
but there existed no such pattern for Japanese firm. 
 Decomposing the ESG factors to further compare country of issues and country of 
incorporation, one could see that the Innovation score and the CSR strategy scores are still 
the ones carrying the environmental and the governance score in Europe. An interesting 
pattern is shown in column 4, the non-significance of the EP in Japan is actually due to the 
opposite influence of the emissions and the resource use score. Emissions performance is 
more important in Japan than in Europe. Also, the Workforce Score explains most of the 
social score significance in Japan.  
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 Finally, Table 19 uses tercile and quartiles decomposition to identify the relationship 
between the variables of interest. It confirms the importance of the EP in Europe and its 
limited effect in Japan. The social and governance factors follow the same pattern as 
described in section 7.5. 
To conclude, the negative relationship between the EP and the cost of debt finance exists for 
bonds whose issuers’ country of incorporation is in Europe or if the bond has been issued in 
Europe. This result is quite natural as only 9 bonds in the sample has a country of 
Incorporation in Europe but is issued somewhere else. 
11.2.5. Control for t-1 and t+1 
 As it is sometimes difficult to gather timely information about the EP, investors could 
use the ES of the previous year to estimate the current environmental risk. If this is the case, 
the ES from the year before the bond issue will have a stronger relationship with the cost of 
debt financing than the current score. Table 20 includes the EP of the year before the bond 
issue in the analysis. Regression (1) and (2) both confirms that ES from previous has no 
statistically significant relationship with the cost of debt. However, the significance of the 
Emissions Score coefficient goes away compared to Table 3.  
 Another potential problem is the direction of the relationship. Cheaper debt could 
allow firms to invest more in their EP through easier access to capital. If that was the case, 
lower cost of debt financing would be correlated with increased ES in the period following 
the issues of the bonds. To test this possibility, I included the ES the year following the issues 
in regression (3) and the two years following the issue in regression (4). As can be seen, only 
the ES at the same time as the issue is statistically significant, ruling out the possibility of a 
reverse relationship. 
 To conclude, the ES is robust to the inclusion of the score the year before the bond 
issue. This indicates that the risk premium in the bond market is based on current 
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information. The innovation score is also robust to this inclusion but the emissions score 
significance goes away. This could be due to low variance in emissions score from year to 
year. Moreover, I did not find evidence relationship between the cost of debt and the ES in 
the following years after the issue, ruling out the possibility of a reverse relationship. 
11.2.6. Matched firms  
One critical potential problem in this analysis is endogeneity. If there is a factor that 
influence both the environmental factor and the cost of debt financing, the results will be 
biased. In order to make sure that firms’ factors do not bias the finding, this paper uses two 
different approaches: the matched firms approach and firm-fixed effects. 
The matched firm approach has already been used by Goss and Roberts (2009) in the 
context of CSR and cost of debt. The idea is to analyse the differences in one variable 
between comparable firms from a treatment and a control group. In my analysis, I use two 
different definitions of treatment group: if the bond issuer is in the upper half distribution or 
is the bond issuer is in the upper quartile distribution. The control groups are the bonds not 
corresponding to the definition in each case. I used different methodologies to show that the 
results are not dependent on the estimator. 
First, I use a propensity score matching estimator. I estimate the propensity score using a 
logit using all the control variables as well as controlling for years and industries effect. I 
exclude the dummy variables Loss, Seniority, Callable and Puttable as they represent only a 
small proportion of the sample but reduce greatly the matching probability. The firm in the 
control group with the lowest propensity score difference with the firm in the treatment group 
is chosen to be the matched firm. I also followed Goss and Roberts by considering as 
potential matches only control firms whose propensity score fall within 0.25 standard 
deviation of the propensity score of the treatment firms. I allow firms in the control group to 
be the matched firm for several firms of the treatment groups as it improves the matching 
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quality (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).  I did not include multiple neighbour selection as the 
results were already significant and this method can increase the bias.  
The results are given in the two first column of Table 21. One could see that, holding all 
the other factors constant, the treatment group pay a lower cost of debt and this result is 
robust with different treatments groups. As King and Nielsen (2016) noticed some problems 
with the propensity score matching, I included other techniques recommended in that paper. 
Second, I use Mahalanobis distance neighbours matching method. This method chooses 
the firm in the control group that has the lowest Mahalanobis distance from the firm in the 
treatment group. I corrected for large-sample bias that can occur when matching on more 
than one continuous variable.  
The results are given in the column 3 and 4 of Table 21. The treatment groups also pay a 
lower cost of debt, suggesting a negative relationship between the EP and the cost of debt. 
Finally, I use the Mahalanobis distance kernel matching. Kernel matching is non-
parametric estimators that uses information about the whole control group to construct the 
outcome (See Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005 for more information). It gives more weights to 
covariates whose Mahalanobis distance between the treatment and the control groups is 
lower. As a result, the variance is lower but the bias can be higher.  
The results are given in the column 5 and 6 of Table 21. The findings are similar to the 
one from column 1 to 4.  
The other approach I used to deal with endogeneity is the inclusion of firm fixed effect. 
Table 22 show the results. First, I investigate the relationship between the cost of debt and the 
ESG factors. One could see that the inclusion of firm fixed effect reduces the significance of 
the coefficient. Indeed, Column 1 shows no sign of significant relationship between the ESG 
performance and the cost of debt financing. I further decompose the sample into tercile and 
quartile according the ESG factors to investigate a potential relationship. While the terciles 
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do not gives any significant results, one could clearly see that the firms at the bottom of the 
ES distribution pay a higher cost of debt than the other. 
 To conclude, both the matched firms approach and the firm fixed-effect found a 
negative relationship between the cost of debt financing and the ES. The results from the 
matched firm approach are robust to different definition of EP and different matching 
method. Therefore, the results are probably not driven by another non-observed variable. 
There is seemingly a causal and unbiased relationship between the cost of debt and the EP. 
11.2.7. Within terciles 
This paper has not considered possible change of effects of the ESG factors on the cost of 
debt according to the level of the ESG factors. In order to investigate this issue, I 
decomposed the sample in environmental terciles. As there exists probably decreasing returns 
on investment, I expect the relationship between EP and the spread to be stronger for the 
lower terciles.  
 Table 23 depicts the results for the decomposition of the environmental factor. As 
expected, the sign and the coefficient of the environmental score decreases as the score 
increases. Interestingly, the opposite pattern appears for the social score, the size of its 
coefficients increases as the environmental score increase. Social score is therefore 


















This table summarizes the distribution of the sample, credit risk and credit rating across sectors. 
The sample observations are allocated to industry classifications according to their membership in 
GICS sectors. 
GICS Industry Sample (%) Average Spread (%) Credit Rating 
Telecommunication 
Services 
12,06 2,7 7,91 
Materials 10,34 1,64 8,78 
Industrials 24,25 1,96 7,05 
Consumer Discretionary 11,02 1,91 7,08 
Consumer Staples 10,84 2,87 7,7 
Utilities 15,45 1,93 7,63 
Energy 3,93 1,92 8,13 
Health Care  4,88 0,78 6,28 
Information Technology 2,53 1,28 8,14 
Real Estate 4,69 1,60 5,8 
Observations 2214 2214 2214 































This table provides a summary statistic of the dependent and independent variables for a sample of 
1377 bonds covering the 2007-2017 period. Spread, Size, Issue Size and Volatility have been 
transformed back to their non-logarithm form for interpretation purpose.  Average Score, Emissions 
Score, Resource use Score and Innovation Score are defined in table 1. Spread is the yield to 
maturity at issue, defined as the difference between the yield to maturity of bond and the yield to 
maturity of the corresponding government bonds of the same maturity. 
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
EP 
ES 1377 76.83 11.52 28.57 96.72 
Emissions Score 1377 77.45 16.95 20.37 99.56 
Resource use Score 1377 80.81 14.62 14.28 99.79 
Innovation Score 1377 72.22 22.23 0.38 99.57 
Social Performance 
Social Score 1377 70.33 16.29 17.18 96.31 
Workforce Score 1377 76.14 19.17 12.5 99.79 
Human Rights Score 1377 65.29 33.38 0 99.57 
Community Score 1377 60.67 28.93 2.94 99.79 
Product Responsibility 1377 71.29 23.77 4.16 99.74 
Governance Performance 
Governance Score 1377 58.68 19.76 10.69 96.85 
Management Score 1377 56.48 28.08 1.06 99.63 
Shareholders 1377 54.03 29.21 0.35 99.14 
CSR strategy 1377 75.21 18.15 0.364 99.75 
Credit Risk Variables 
Spread (bp) 1377 168 180 1.1 1300 
Credit Rating 1377 7.49 2.01 3 12 
Firms Control Variables 
Leverage 1377 0.69 0.12 0.04 1.26 
Size (In BM$) 1377 76,2 72,1 1.68 438 
Capital Intensity 1377 0,29 0.20 0 1.02 
Interest Coverage 1377 19.73 54.10 -188.2 1269.93 
ROA 1377 0,32 0.036 -0.16 0.33 
Loss 1377 0.023 0.15 0 1 
Beta 1377 0.99 0.29 0.23 1.80 
Institution Ownership (%) 1377 46.84 19.47 0.095 98.74 
Market-to-Book  1377 1,52 5.60 -92.42 29,93 
Volatility 1-year prior issue 1349 0.58 0.34   
Return 1-month prior issue 1350 0.007 0.07 -0.26 0.33 
Speculative 1377 0.0646 0.249 0 1 
Bonds Control variable 
Time to Maturity (in years) 1377 8.29 6.86 0.1111 50 
Issue Size (BM$) 1377 1,3 2.4 0.0198 449 
Callable 1377 0.087 0.28 0 1 
Puttable 1377 0.0007 0.03 0 1 
Seniority 1377 0.053 0.224 0 1 
Country  
Australia 1377 0.024 0.15 0 1 
Japan 1377 0.39 0.49 0 1 







This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of a bond and the 
corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the environmental management measure 
and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The robust 
Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1) uses the ESG combined scores. (2) uses the 
decomposition of the ESG combined scores. (3) uses the decomposition of the each ESG scores. (4) 
sorts the firms in terciles according to their ESG scores. (5) sorts the firms in quartiles according to 
ESG scores. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient. P-value are reported in 
the parenthesis below the coefficient.   * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
ESGCombinedS
coreInthelast1 
-0.0000655     
 (0.184)  
 
   
Environmental_
Score 
 -0.000199***    
  (0.002)    
      
Social_Score  -0.0000261    
  (0.683)    
      
Governance_Sc
ore 
 -0.0000365    
  (0.301)    







   (0.066)   







   (0.004)   






   (0.932)   






   (0.581)   






   (0.895)   






   (0.233)   
      
ProductResponsi
bility_Score 
  0.0000295   
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   (0.324)   






   (0.688)   






   (0.724)   






   (0.581)   
      
Env_Ter2    -0.00242  
    (0.119)  
      
Env_Ter3    -0.00387**  
    (0.031)  
      
Soc_Ter2    -0.00177  
    (0.340)  
      
Soc_Ter3    -0.000865  
    (0.721)  
      
Gov_Ter2    -0.00357**  
    (0.027)  
      
Gov_Ter3    -0.00281*  
    (0.081)  
      
Env_Quart2     -0.00128 
     (0.557) 
      
Env_Quart3     -0.00548*** 
     (0.004) 
      
Env_Quart4     -0.00674*** 
     (0.001) 
      
Soc_Quart2     -0.00104 
     (0.558) 
      
Soc_Quart3     -0.00292 
     (0.242) 
      
Soc_Quart4     -0.0000220 
     (0.994) 
      
Gov_Quart2     -0.00380* 
     (0.052) 
      
Gov_Quart3     -0.00227 
     (0.255) 
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Gov_Quart4     -0.00247 
     (0.217) 
      
Maturity_Years 0.000844*** 0.000820*** 0.000814*
** 
0.000835*** 0.000826*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Issue_Size 0.000156 0.000103 0.0000883 0.000151 0.0000245 
 (0.859) (0.907) (0.916) (0.863) (0.977) 
      
Callable_Dumm
y 
0.00716* 0.00718* 0.00749* 0.00752* 0.00699* 
 (0.076) (0.071) (0.055) (0.060) (0.081) 
      
Seniority_Dum
my 
-0.000864 -0.00109 -0.00273 -0.000797 -0.00142 
 (0.801) (0.766) (0.484) (0.798) (0.714) 
      
Putable_Dummy 0.0198 0.0201* 0.0199* 0.0197* 0.0220* 
 (0.106) (0.086) (0.076) (0.089) (0.059) 
      
Speculative 0.0142*** 0.0121*** 0.0124*** 0.0128*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) 
      
Firm_Size 0.00336*** 0.00411*** 0.00411*** 0.00391*** 0.00396*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Credit_Rating 0.00221*** 0.00216*** 0.00224*** 0.00220*** 0.00233*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Lev -0.00147 -0.00163 -0.00361 -0.00245 -0.00258 
 (0.854) (0.840) (0.663) (0.759) (0.754) 
      
CapInt 0.00356 0.00289 0.00184 0.00257 0.00379 
 (0.358) (0.498) (0.679) (0.518) (0.402) 
      
Loss 0.00782** 0.00783** 0.00737** 0.00725** 0.00739** 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.041) (0.047) (0.046) 
      
ROA 0.0316 0.0299 0.0268 0.0266 0.0245 
 (0.185) (0.192) (0.244) (0.245) (0.265) 
      
IntCov 0.00000335 0.00000472 0.0000037
4 
0.00000682 0.00000649 
 (0.581) (0.434) (0.522) (0.288) (0.304) 
      
VOL 0.00259 0.00308 0.00326 0.00358 0.00281 
 (0.446) (0.331) (0.257) (0.239) (0.338) 
      
M_t_B -0.000173* -0.000170* -0.000163 -0.000209** -0.000197** 
 (0.054) (0.070) (0.136) (0.027) (0.037) 
      
Return_t1 0.00154 0.000152 0.000513 0.000567 -0.000331 
 (0.814) (0.981) (0.931) (0.929) (0.960) 
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Beta -0.00655* -0.00465 -0.00457 -0.00582 -0.00457 
 (0.098) (0.219) (0.244) (0.130) (0.210) 
      




 (0.187) (0.065) (0.090) (0.088) (0.018) 
      
Australia 0.0422*** 0.0442*** 0.0439*** 0.0450*** 0.0440*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Europe 0.00364 0.00414 0.00422 0.00431 0.00310 
      
_cons -0.0773** -0.0787** -0.0775** -0.0849*** -0.0868*** 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) 
R2 0.375 0.387 0.394 0.388 0.401 










































This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing across maturities. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of 
a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the environmental 
management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. This table uses the ESG combined 
scores. The dataset has been divided into 4 sub-datasets: (1) Bonds with a maturity of less than 3 
years, (2) bonds with a maturity between 3 and 5 years, (3) bonds with a maturity between 5 and 10 
years and (4) bonds with maturity longer than 10 years. P-value are reported in the parenthesis 
below the coefficient. 
  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
ESGCombinedScoreInthelast1 0.000180*** -0.000109 -0.0000290 -0.000133 
 (0.009) (0.386) (0.612) (0.109) 
     
Maturity_Years 0.00684*** -0.00252 0.000182 0.000571*** 
 (0.000) (0.520) (0.685) (0.007) 
     
Issue_Size 0.000358 -0.00553*** -0.00310*** 0.000418 
 (0.130) (0.000) (0.005) (0.776) 
     
Callable_Dummy -0.0187*** -0.00547 0.00288 0.00739 
 (0.000) (0.302) (0.368) (0.164) 
     
Seniority_Dummy -0.0151 0.0226 0.00480 -0.00888** 
 (0.155) (0.127) (0.220) (0.031) 
     
Putable_Dummy 0 0 0.0207 0 
 (.) (.) (0.153) (.) 
     
Speculative 0.000893 0.00640 0.0134*** 0.0106 
 (0.733) (0.452) (0.001) (0.284) 
     
Firm_Size 0.000338 0.00620** 0.00453*** 0.00376** 
 (0.832) (0.027) (0.002) (0.020) 
     
Credit_Rating 0.000842 0.00494*** 0.00248*** 0.00304*** 
 (0.151) (0.004) (0.001) (0.008) 
     
Lev -0.0224* -0.0306 0.00423 -0.00585 
 (0.061) (0.111) (0.641) (0.592) 
     
CapInt -0.0266*** 0.00961 0.0108** 0.00756 
 (0.000) (0.303) (0.048) (0.123) 
     
Loss 0.00931* 0.00463 0.00398 0.0102 
 (0.068) (0.575) (0.315) (0.247) 
     
ROA -0.0582* 0.0366 0.0110 0.0705* 
 (0.098) (0.538) (0.697) (0.070) 
     
IntCov 0.0000143 0.00000603 0.00000848 0.00000176 
 (0.651) (0.477) (0.232) (0.964) 
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VOL 0.00165 0.00302 0.00391 -0.0000497 
 (0.556) (0.672) (0.347) (0.994) 
     
M_t_B 0.00121 -0.0000330 -0.000239* 0.0000653 
 (0.218) (0.836) (0.061) (0.685) 
     
Return_t1 0.00387 -0.00183 0.0137 -0.0198 
 (0.473) (0.885) (0.162) (0.204) 
     
Beta 0.000760 0.00175 -0.00886** -0.00396 
 (0.916) (0.785) (0.038) (0.410) 
     
Inst_Own_Per -0.00000823 0.000243** -0.0000195 0.000120*** 
 (0.869) (0.012) (0.651) (0.009) 
     
Australia 0 -0.0198** 0.0308** 0.0344*** 
 (.) (0.047) (0.037) (0.006) 
     
Europe 0.0149*** -0.00720 -0.00468 -0.00212 
 (0.001) (0.298) (0.382) (0.813) 
_cons -0.0299 -0.0249 -0.0236 -0.109** 
 (0.482) (0.660) (0.540) (0.050) 
R2 0.835 0.600 0.489 0.354 



































This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost 
of debt financing across maturities. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity 
of a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the environmental 
management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. This table uses the decomposition 
of the ESG combined scores. The dataset has been divided into 4 sub-datasets: (1) Bonds with a 
maturity of less than 3 years, (2) bonds with a maturity between 3 and 5 years, (3) bonds with a 
maturity between 5 and 10 years and (4) bonds with maturity longer than 10 years. P-value are 
reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient. 
  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Environmental_Score -0.0000286 0.0000869 -0.000312*** -0.000185** 
 (0.812) (0.669) (0.001) (0.023) 
     
Social_Score -0.00000975 -0.0000274 0.0000293 -0.0000771 
 (0.915) (0.834) (0.568) (0.389) 
     
Governance_Score -0.0000459 -0.0000128 0.0000435 -0.000162** 
 (0.315) (0.902) (0.300) (0.018) 
     
Maturity_Years 0.00633*** -0.00263 0.000268 0.000575*** 
 (0.000) (0.518) (0.538) (0.005) 
     
Issue_Size 0.000319 -0.00531*** -0.00301*** 0.000343 
 (0.217) (0.000) (0.005) (0.806) 
     
Callable_Dummy -0.0185*** -0.00786 0.00348 0.00767 
 (0.003) (0.146) (0.277) (0.129) 
     
Seniority_Dummy -0.0193 0.0220 0.00700 -0.0117*** 
 (0.175) (0.121) (0.124) (0.010) 
     
Putable_Dummy 0 0 0.0231* 0 
 (.) (.) (0.083) (.) 
     
Speculative -0.000742 0.00652 0.0102*** 0.0107 
 (0.890) (0.464) (0.009) (0.231) 
     
Firm_Size -0.00352 0.00586** 0.00564*** 0.00512** 
 (0.126) (0.042) (0.000) (0.010) 
     
Credit_Rating 0.000143 0.00478*** 0.00282*** 0.00300*** 
 (0.871) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) 
     
Lev -0.00868 -0.0257 0.00352 -0.00732 
 (0.519) (0.219) (0.697) (0.474) 
     
CapInt -0.0287*** 0.00770 0.0121** 0.00478 
 (0.002) (0.375) (0.034) (0.326) 
     
Loss 0.00393 0.00374 0.00483 0.0131 
 (0.445) (0.673) (0.211) (0.124) 
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ROA -0.0434 0.0491 0.0135 0.0854** 
 (0.279) (0.424) (0.606) (0.023) 
     
IntCov 0.0000339 0.00000539 0.0000115* 0.0000406 
 (0.381) (0.515) (0.090) (0.266) 
     
VOL 0.00190 0.00288 0.00412 0.00266 
 (0.584) (0.730) (0.298) (0.650) 
     
M_t_B 0.0000764 -0.00000595 -0.000219* 0.0000383 
 (0.928) (0.969) (0.073) (0.807) 
     
Return_t1 0.00675 -0.00163 0.00923 -0.0218 
 (0.306) (0.899) (0.297) (0.169) 
     
Beta 0.00180 0.00205 -0.00599 -0.00271 
 (0.831) (0.776) (0.112) (0.529) 
     
Inst_Own_Per -0.0000499 0.000220** 0.00000122 0.000110** 
 (0.411) (0.023) (0.974) (0.016) 
     
Australia 0 -0.0221** 0.0308** 0.0409*** 
 (.) (0.033) (0.016) (0.001) 
     
Europe 0.0124*** -0.00608 -0.00438 -0.000821 
 (0.003) (0.366) (0.379) (0.915) 
     
R2 0.814 0.598 0.519 0.375 






























This table summarises the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost 
of debt financing across maturities. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity 
of a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the environmental 
management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. This table uses the decomposition 
of each ESG combined scores. The dataset has been divided into 4 sub-datasets: (1) Bonds with a 
maturity of less than 3 years, (2) bonds with a maturity between 3 and 5 years, (3) bonds with a 
maturity between 5 and 10 years and (4) bonds with maturity longer than 10 years. P-value are 
reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Emissions_Score 0.000112 0.000125 -0.000147*** -0.0000796 
 (0.175) (0.284) (0.004) (0.325) 
     
Innovation_Score -0.0000978 -0.0000616 -0.000145*** -0.0000471 
 (0.261) (0.597) (0.006) (0.150) 
     
Resourceuse_Score -0.000127 0.0000548 0.00000754 -0.0000815 
 (0.240) (0.730) (0.888) (0.270) 
     
Workforce_Score -0.0000476 -0.0000103 0.0000208 -0.00000511 
 (0.346) (0.916) (0.594) (0.908) 
     
HumanRights_Score 0.0000501 0.0000752 0.00000384 -0.0000299 
 (0.382) (0.411) (0.868) (0.326) 
     
Community_Score 0.0000483 0.0000202 -0.0000402 -0.0000897 
 (0.546) (0.807) (0.227) (0.146) 
     
ProductResponsibility_Score 0.000201 0.0000226 0.0000237 0.0000196 
 (0.105) (0.841) (0.503) (0.638) 
     
Management_Score -0.0000728 -0.0000811 0.0000513* -0.000102 
 (0.188) (0.345) (0.075) (0.102) 
     
Shareholders_Score 0.0000880 0.000129* -0.0000320 -0.0000307 
 (0.256) (0.070) (0.183) (0.534) 
     
CSRStrategy_Score -0.0000118 -0.0000463 0.00000534 -0.0000196 
 (0.877) (0.642) (0.918) (0.726) 
     
Maturity_Years 0.00541*** -0.00294 0.000334 0.000567*** 
 (0.001) (0.466) (0.461) (0.005) 
     
Issue_Size 0.000204 -0.00542*** -0.00283** 0.0000715 
 (0.357) (0.000) (0.010) (0.957) 
     
Callable_Dummy -0.0160*** -0.00993* 0.00364 0.00867* 
 (0.000) (0.082) (0.282) (0.084) 
     
Seniority_Dummy -0.00857 0.00622 0.00469 -0.0123*** 
 (0.579) (0.725) (0.306) (0.010) 
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Putable_Dummy 0 0 0.0241* 0 
 (.) (.) (0.068) (.) 
     
Speculative -0.00348 0.0144* 0.0102*** 0.00948 
 (0.711) (0.080) (0.004) (0.276) 
     
Firm_Size -0.00159 0.00387 0.00556*** 0.00576*** 
 (0.736) (0.214) (0.000) (0.007) 
     
Credit_Rating 0.000692 0.00387** 0.00296*** 0.00325*** 
 (0.637) (0.012) (0.000) (0.002) 
     
Lev -0.0341 -0.0165 0.00107 -0.0107 
 (0.107) (0.393) (0.908) (0.315) 
     
CapInt -0.0234** -0.000431 0.0106* 0.00343 
 (0.023) (0.974) (0.071) (0.430) 
     
Loss -0.00203 0.00217 0.00503 0.0128 
 (0.780) (0.786) (0.217) (0.122) 
     
ROA -0.0750** 0.0555 0.00282 0.0838** 
 (0.049) (0.403) (0.914) (0.022) 
     
IntCov 0.0000119 0.00000757 0.0000103 0.0000359 
 (0.743) (0.354) (0.108) (0.355) 
     
VOL 0.00409 0.000345 0.00323 0.00367 
 (0.157) (0.968) (0.379) (0.526) 
     
M_t_B 0.00210 0.000157 -0.000245* 0.0000103 
 (0.221) (0.210) (0.081) (0.953) 
     
Return_t1 0.00800 0.00182 0.00984 -0.0218 
 (0.180) (0.907) (0.271) (0.165) 
     
Beta 0.00632 0.00775 -0.00626* -0.00358 
 (0.486) (0.341) (0.099) (0.438) 
     
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000199 0.000133 -0.00000360 0.0000976** 
 (0.684) (0.195) (0.921) (0.043) 
     
Australia 0 -0.0292** 0.0307** 0.0406*** 
 (.) (0.018) (0.010) (0.002) 
     
Europe 0.00638 -0.0106 -0.00357 -0.000557 
 (0.158) (0.220) (0.459) (0.937) 
     
_cons 0.0604 -0.00567 -0.0438 -0.109** 
 (0.558) (0.942) (0.250) (0.016) 
R2 0.857 0.629 0.531 0.382 







This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost 
of debt financing across maturities. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield 
maturity of a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the 
environmental management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year 
and industry fixed effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. This table 
sorts the firms in terciles according to their ESG scores. The dataset has been divided into 4 sub-
datasets: (1) Bonds with a maturity of less than 3 years, (2) bonds with a maturity between 3 and 
5 years, (3) bonds with a maturity between 5 and 10 years and (4) bonds with maturity longer 
than 10 years. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient.    
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Env_Ter2 0.00237 0.00449 -0.00431** -0.00555*** 
 (0.281) (0.236) (0.039) (0.001) 
     
Env_Ter3 0.00444 -0.0000649 -0.00657** -0.00404* 
 (0.172) (0.987) (0.022) (0.086) 
     
Soc_Ter2 0.00164 0.00491 0.000565 -0.00555** 
 (0.732) (0.224) (0.754) (0.012) 
     
Soc_Ter3 0.000393 -0.00134 0.000183 -0.000162 
 (0.939) (0.822) (0.925) (0.959) 
     
Gov_Ter2 0.00375 0.00249 -0.000319 -0.00787*** 
 (0.139) (0.588) (0.850) (0.001) 
     
Gov_Ter3 -0.00408 0.000171 0.00105 -0.00762*** 
 (0.363) (0.975) (0.620) (0.006) 
     
Maturity_Years 0.00510*** -0.00165 0.000251 0.000605*** 
 (0.000) (0.678) (0.571) (0.003) 
     
Issue_Size 0.000221 -0.00538*** -0.00299*** 0.000393 
 (0.312) (0.000) (0.005) (0.773) 
     
Callable_Dummy -0.0227*** -0.00592 0.00358 0.00902* 
 (0.000) (0.292) (0.278) (0.070) 
     
Seniority_Dummy -0.0432** 0.0239 0.00679 -0.0101*** 
 (0.047) (0.106) (0.126) (0.005) 
     
Putable_Dummy 0 0 0.0238* 0 
 (.) (.) (0.072) (.) 
     
Speculative 0.00315 0.0108 0.0114*** 0.0133 
 (0.444) (0.172) (0.004) (0.119) 
     
Firm_Size -0.00588** 0.00505** 0.00526*** 0.00434** 
 (0.031) (0.042) (0.001) (0.019) 
     
Credit_Rating -0.00171 0.00397*** 0.00266*** 0.00361*** 
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 (0.115) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Lev -0.00633 -0.0181 0.00346 -0.00917 
 (0.690) (0.341) (0.705) (0.293) 
     
CapInt -0.0431*** 0.00517 0.0121** 0.00578 
 (0.001) (0.589) (0.041) (0.183) 
     
Loss 0.0143** 0.00164 0.00512 0.0110 
 (0.031) (0.827) (0.200) (0.199) 
     
ROA -0.0182 0.0369 0.00964 0.0827** 
 (0.569) (0.568) (0.723) (0.022) 
     
IntCov 0.00000199 0.00000637 0.0000112 0.0000384 
 (0.967) (0.308) (0.128) (0.272) 
     
VOL -0.000980 0.00178 0.00388 0.00312 
 (0.785) (0.816) (0.314) (0.576) 
     
M_t_B 0.00121 0.0000465 -0.000232* -0.0000258 
 (0.151) (0.736) (0.070) (0.840) 
     
Return_t1 0.00330 0.00226 0.00950 -0.0248 
 (0.502) (0.875) (0.281) (0.119) 
     
Beta 0.0111 0.00746 -0.00667* -0.00349 
 (0.108) (0.264) (0.080) (0.391) 
     
Inst_Own_Per -0.0000666 0.000213** -0.00000227 0.0000991** 
 (0.386) (0.026) (0.953) (0.039) 
     
Australia 0 -0.0196* 0.0312** 0.0396*** 
 (.) (0.061) (0.019) (0.000) 
     
Europe 0.00573 -0.00467 -0.00400 -0.00285 
 (0.223) (0.472) (0.439) (0.711) 
     
_cons 0.152** -0.0230 -0.0456 -0.107** 
 (0.039) (0.689) (0.251) (0.015) 
R2 0.859 0.626 0.506 0.405 
N 218 120 551 459 
















This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing across industries. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of 
a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the environmental 
management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1), (3) and (5) use risky industries 
data while (2), (4) and (6) use the other industries data. P-value are reported in the parenthesis 
below the coefficient.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 LnSprea
d 









    
 (0.021) (0.091)     
       




   (0.293) (0.010)   
       






   (0.838) (0.660)   
       






   (0.970) (0.066)   
       
Env_Ter2     0.00196 -
0.00408** 
     (0.300) (0.017) 
       




     (0.014) (0.041) 
       
Soc_Ter2     -0.00292 -0.00160 
     (0.248) (0.375) 
       
Soc_Ter3     -0.00373 0.000307 
     (0.275) (0.898) 
       
Gov_Ter2     0.00454 -
0.00424**
* 
     (0.207) (0.010) 
       





     (0.868) (0.007) 















 (0.011) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 










 (0.003) (0.573) (0.007) (0.516) (0.000) (0.492) 
       
Callable_Dummy -0.00106 0.00944** -0.00480* 0.00946** -
0.00763** 
0.00983** 
 (0.678) (0.031) (0.098) (0.029) (0.041) (0.022) 
       
Seniority_Dummy 0 -0.00176 0 -0.00225 0 -0.00159 
 (.) (0.631) (.) (0.579) (.) (0.646) 
       
Putable_Dummy 0.0989**
* 
0 0 0 0.0792*** 0 
 (0.000) (.) (.) (.) (0.000) (.) 
       
Speculative 0.0137**
* 
0.0143** 0.0204*** 0.0116** 0.0185*** 0.0123** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.001) (0.035) (0.006) (0.016) 







 (0.488) (0.006) (0.523) (0.003) (0.520) (0.003) 












 (0.870) (0.002) (0.523) (0.003) (0.764) (0.002) 
       
Lev 0.0356** -0.00665 0.0329 -0.00587 0.0187 -0.00719 
 (0.012) (0.464) (0.125) (0.526) (0.276) (0.416) 
       
CapInt 0.0154* 0.00354 0.0158 0.00229 0.0148 0.00212 
 (0.097) (0.373) (0.156) (0.595) (0.162) (0.588) 
       




 (0.245) (0.037) (0.676) (0.060) (0.990) (0.060) 
       
ROA 0.0342 0.0374 0.00417 0.0335 -0.00928 0.0303 
 (0.308) (0.159) (0.912) (0.197) (0.781) (0.237) 















 (0.164) (0.662) (0.377) (0.537) (0.934) (0.438) 
       
VOL -0.00568 0.00362 -0.00636 0.00449 -0.00357 0.00524 
 (0.208) (0.362) (0.194) (0.221) (0.454) (0.134) 
       









 (0.025) (0.046) (0.205) (0.058) (0.584) (0.018) 
       
Return_t1 -0.00314 0.000104 0.00249 -0.000620 0.00699 -0.000730 
 (0.662) (0.989) (0.772) (0.933) (0.485) (0.920) 
       
Beta -0.00370 -0.00257 0.00370 -0.000706 0.00761* -0.00214 
 (0.467) (0.555) (0.557) (0.867) (0.058) (0.614) 
















 (0.129) (0.053) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) 
       
Australia 0 0.0397*** 0.0917*** 0.0424*** 0 0.0421*** 
 (.) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (.) (0.000) 
       
Europe 0.0165**
* 
0.000378 0.0154** 0.001000 0.0182*** 0.000075
1 
 (0.001) (0.941) (0.043) (0.826) (0.005) (0.987) 
       
_cons -0.0862* -0.0588 -0.0209 -0.0596* -0.0275 -0.0627* 
 (0.083) (0.104) (0.727) (0.081) (0.581) (0.060) 
R2 0.827 0.380 0.812 0.392 0.839 0.398 

































This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing across regions. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of a 
bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the environmental 
management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1) and (3) use European data while 
(2) and (4) use Japanese industries data. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the 
coefficient.   * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Environmental_Score -0.000150* -0.0000786   
 (0.092) (0.233)   
     
Social_Score 0.000000779 -0.0000227   
 (0.992) (0.658)   
     
Governance_Score -0.0000989* 0.0000300   
 (0.089) (0.198)   
     
Emissions_Score   -0.000000287 -0.0000616 
   (0.996) (0.135) 
     
Innovation_Score   -0.0000981** -0.0000225 
   (0.023) (0.354) 
     
Resourceuse_Score   -0.0000531 0.0000107 
   (0.322) (0.775) 
     
WorkforceScoreInthelast11F   0.000000240 -0.0000552 
   (0.995) (0.127) 
     
HumanRightsScoreInthelast1   0.00000224 0.00000928 
   (0.954) (0.540) 
     
CommunityScoreInthelast11F   -0.0000261 0.0000148 
   (0.476) (0.610) 
     
ProductResponsibilityScoreIn   0.0000821* 0.0000186 
   (0.067) (0.401) 
     
ManagementScoreInthelast11   -0.0000722* 0.0000276 
   (0.098) (0.214) 
     
ShareholdersScoreInthelast1   0.0000467 0.00000622 
   (0.205) (0.787) 
     
CSRStrategyScoreInthelast1   -0.000144*** 0.0000622 
   (0.007) (0.220) 
     
Maturity_Years 0.000909*** 0.000548*** 0.000844*** 0.000573*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Issue_Size 0.00173*** -0.00512*** 0.00143*** -0.00531*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
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Callable_Dummy -0.000157 0.0352*** 0.000602 0.0325*** 
 (0.950) (0.000) (0.813) (0.000) 
     
Seniority_Dummy 0 -0.00484* 0 -0.00541* 
 (.) (0.059) (.) (0.073) 
     
Putable_Dummy 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Speculative 0.00642 -0.00488 0.00539 -0.00626 
 (0.213) (0.464) (0.323) (0.362) 
     
Firm_Size 0.00286* 0.00190 0.00351** 0.00172 
 (0.062) (0.355) (0.020) (0.393) 
     
Credit_Rating 0.00223** 0.000146 0.00198** -0.0000769 
 (0.027) (0.635) (0.016) (0.833) 
     
Lev 0.00481 0.0104 0.00168 0.00966 
 (0.499) (0.157) (0.808) (0.183) 
     
CapInt 0.0133 -0.00480 0.0159** -0.00248 
 (0.103) (0.127) (0.040) (0.259) 
     
Loss 0.0110** 0.00241 0.0121** 0.00271* 
 (0.025) (0.163) (0.016) (0.075) 
     
ROA 0.00532 -0.0402 0.00770 -0.0502 
 (0.807) (0.348) (0.745) (0.266) 
     
IntCov 0.0000419* -0.0000133** 0.0000425* -0.0000122** 
 (0.097) (0.018) (0.083) (0.025) 
     
VOL -0.00159 0.000703 0.000899 -0.000535 
 (0.692) (0.698) (0.781) (0.810) 
     
M_t_B -0.000135* 0.00196** -0.0000174 0.00185** 
 (0.076) (0.047) (0.818) (0.045) 
     
Return_t1 -0.0104 0.00507 -0.00460 0.00351 
 (0.218) (0.443) (0.551) (0.516) 
     
Beta -0.000845 0.00106 0.00186 0.00429* 
 (0.861) (0.681) (0.652) (0.091) 
     
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000854*** 0.0000141 0.0000875*** 0.0000255 
 (0.002) (0.718) (0.002) (0.443) 
     
Australia 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Europe 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
_cons -0.104** 0.0763 -0.100** 0.0707 
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 (0.023) (0.146) (0.014) (0.210) 
R2 0.394 0.755 0.421 0.765 
























































This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing across regions. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of a 
bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the environmental 
management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed 
effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1) and (3) use European data while 
(2) and (4) use Japanese industries data. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the 
coefficient.   * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Env_Ter2 -0.000804 0.000338   
 (0.621) (0.869)   
     
Env_Ter3 -0.00110 -0.00180   
 (0.613) (0.307)   
     
Soc_Ter2 -0.000894 -0.000330   
 (0.823) (0.771)   
     
Soc_Ter3 -0.00115 0.00000247   
 (0.794) (0.999)   
     
Gov_Ter2 -0.00501*** -0.000516   
 (0.008) (0.648)   
     
Gov_Ter3 -0.00601*** 0.00165   
 (0.007) (0.215)   
     
Env_Quart2   -0.00423** 0.00122 
   (0.048) (0.587) 
     
Env_Quart3   -0.00772*** -0.0000813 
   (0.004) (0.966) 
     
Env_Quart4   -0.00817*** -0.00192 
   (0.004) (0.302) 
     
Gov_Quart2   -0.00609*** -0.000318 
   (0.004) (0.730) 
     
Gov_Quart3   -0.00204 -0.000122 
   (0.413) (0.907) 
     
Gov_Quart4   -0.00481* 0.00229 
   (0.056) (0.111) 
     
Soc_Quart2   0.00565** -0.00205 
   (0.040) (0.174) 
     
Soc_Quart3   0.00226 -0.000458 
   (0.477) (0.820) 
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Soc_Quart4   0.00435 0.000273 
   (0.161) (0.878) 
Maturity_Years 0.000910*** 0.000561*** 0.000874*** 0.000580*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Issue_Size 0.00178*** -0.00519*** 0.00159*** -0.00514*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
     
Callable_Dummy -0.0000668 0.0339*** -0.000417 0.0343*** 
 (0.978) (0.000) (0.876) (0.000) 
     
Seniority_Dummy 0 -0.00440* 0 -0.00446* 
 (.) (0.074) (.) (0.089) 
     
Putable_Dummy 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Speculative 0.00699 -0.00513 0.00618 -0.00553 
 (0.165) (0.462) (0.177) (0.418) 
     
Firm_Size 0.00233 0.00160 0.00385*** 0.00183 
 (0.107) (0.379) (0.008) (0.344) 
     
Credit_Rating 0.00211** -0.0000330 0.00257*** -0.0000964 
 (0.031) (0.914) (0.008) (0.715) 
     
Lev 0.00394 0.0125** 0.00303 0.0126** 
 (0.612) (0.042) (0.681) (0.045) 
     
CapInt 0.0120 -0.00486* 0.0109 -0.00612* 
 (0.136) (0.076) (0.201) (0.065) 
     
Loss 0.0112** 0.00163 0.0109** 0.00120 
 (0.024) (0.369) (0.027) (0.543) 
     
ROA 0.00497 -0.0366 0.0115 -0.0410 
 (0.828) (0.344) (0.583) (0.335) 
     
IntCov 0.0000393 -0.0000120** 0.0000404 -0.0000131** 
 (0.109) (0.025) (0.108) (0.020) 
     
VOL -0.00145 0.000973 -0.00000813 0.00129 
 (0.701) (0.596) (0.998) (0.520) 
     
M_t_B -0.000168** 0.00199* -0.000135* 0.00182** 
 (0.032) (0.070) (0.083) (0.032) 
     
Return_t1 -0.00888 0.00600 -0.0114 0.00587 
 (0.278) (0.381) (0.181) (0.363) 
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Beta -0.00138 0.00153 -0.00374 0.000704 
 (0.764) (0.528) (0.448) (0.782) 
     
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000725** 0.00000988 0.000120*** -0.00000291 
 (0.021) (0.782) (0.000) (0.935) 
     
_cons -0.101** 0.0760 -0.130*** 0.0771 
 (0.032) (0.122) (0.003) (0.103) 
R2 0.397 0.755 0.416 0.761 















































This table summarises the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the credit 
rating. I used a probit regression between a dummy variable that takes value of one when a firm’ 
rating is in the upper half rating of the sample and EPs measures, Credit_Rating_Half, and the 
environmental management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1) uses the 
decomposition of the ESG combined scores. (2)  uses the decomposition of the each ESG scores. 
(3) sorts the firms in terciles according to their ESG scores and (4) sorts the firms in quartiles 
according to ESG scores.  P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient.  * p < 0.1, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 









     
Environmental_Score 0.0368***    
 (0.000)    
     
Social_Score -0.0104***    
 (0.002)    
     
Governance_Score -0.000562    
 (0.799)    
     
Emissions_Score  0.0242***   
  (0.000)   
     
Resourceuse_Score  -0.000902   
  (0.789)   
     
Innovation_Score  0.0131***   
  (0.000)   
     
WorkforceScore  -0.0171***   
  (0.000)   
     
HumanRightsScore  0.00332**   
  (0.049)   
     
CommunityScore  0.000183   
  (0.932)   
     
ProductResponsibility
Score 
 0.000119   
  (0.956)   
     
ManagementScore  -0.00368**   
  (0.042)   
     
ShareholdersScore  -0.000156   
  (0.927)   
     
CSRStrategyScore  0.0132***   
  (0.000)   
     
Env_Ter2   0.427***  
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   (0.000)  
     
Env_Ter3   1.005***  
   (0.000)  
     
Soc_Ter2   0.234*  
   (0.052)  
     
Soc_Ter3   -0.392***  
   (0.005)  
     
Gov_Ter2   -0.0234  
   (0.825)  
     
Gov_Ter3   -0.0652  
   (0.558)  
     
Env_Quart2    -0.0277 
    (0.835) 
     
Env_Quart3    0.438*** 
    (0.001) 
     
Env_Quart4    0.993*** 
    (0.000) 
     
Soc_Quart2    0.184 
    (0.216) 
     
Soc_Quart3    0.00374 
    (0.980) 
     
Soc_Quart4    -0.432*** 
    (0.009) 
     
Gov_Quart2    -0.0360 
    (0.769) 
     
Gov_Quart3    0.0281 
    (0.825) 
     
Gov_Quart4    -0.189 
    (0.150) 
 
Maturity_Years -0.0349*** -0.0305*** -0.0374*** -0.0388*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Issue_Size -0.159*** -0.156*** -0.159*** -0.163*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Callable_Dummy 0.495*** 0.522*** 0.465*** 0.449*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) 
     
Seniority_Dummy -2.010*** -2.024*** -1.976*** -1.715*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Putable_Dummy 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Firm_Size -0.661*** -0.746*** -0.625*** -0.596*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Lev 5.561*** 5.937*** 5.505*** 5.321*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
CapInt -0.545** -0.0162 -0.640*** -0.588** 
 (0.012) (0.946) (0.004) (0.010) 
     
ROA -2.896 -1.690 -2.485 -2.448 
 (0.136) (0.397) (0.221) (0.221) 
     
IntCov -0.0159*** -0.0151*** -0.0174*** -0.0157*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
VOL 1.341*** 1.434*** 1.238*** 1.349*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
M_t_B -0.0947*** -0.0802** -0.101*** -0.0850** 
 (0.004) (0.029) (0.002) (0.012) 
     
Return_t1 -0.439 -0.371 -0.460 -0.754 
 (0.457) (0.546) (0.440) (0.209) 
     
Beta -0.546*** -0.318* -0.613*** -0.667*** 
 (0.001) (0.085) (0.001) (0.000) 
     
Inst_Own_Per 0.00635*** 0.00820*** 0.00646*** 0.00722*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) 
     
_cons 20.48*** 21.65*** 21.02*** 21.10*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
pseudo R2 0.363 0.403 0.375 0.379 








This tables summarizes the marginal effects for the credit rating analysis. The marginal effects indicate the probability of a firm having a particular credit 
rating given a change in an explanatory variable while holding the explanatory variables fixed at their mean. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below 
the coefficient. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 



































1.40e-07    
(0.853) 
Governance_Score -9.88e-10  
(0.818)   
.0000471 
(0.94)   
    
.0021437*** 
(0.008)     
.0010647 
(0.323)     
.0020934** 
(0.013) 
    
-.0052691*** 
(0.000)    
-.00003 
(0.969)     
.0000284 
(0.433)    
-1.25e-06    
(0.744) 
Maturity_Years 4.01e-08 
(0.718)    
.0038455** 
(0.038)    
.0018909** 
(0.028)    
.0050342 
(0.132)    
-.0029665 
(0.22)    
-.0014151 
(0.714)    
 
-.0058986** 
(0.028)     
 
-7.84e-06 
(0.627)    








(0.008)    
.0203138* 
(0.094)    
-.0203392*** 
(0.01)    
.0095734 
(0.42)    
-.0399794*** 
(0.000)    
-.0000229     
(0.557) 
-5.77e-06 
(0.758)    
Firm_Size 1.06e-06  
(0.715)   
.0201066 
(0.305)    
.0405163** 
(0.013) 
    
.2944976*** 
(0.000)     
.0053129 
(0.771)    
-.2085187*** 
(0.000)    
-.1332923***    
(0.000) 
.0002168 
(0.467)    
-6.84e-06 
(0.778)    
Lev -6.72e-06    
(0.713) 
-.4781104*** 
(0.001)     
-.0806344 
(0.127)    
-2.264959*** 
(0.000)    
.6139115*** 
(0.000)    
1.621758*** 
(0.000)    
.47642*** 




(0.722)    
CapInt 2.59e-06 
(0.72)    
.4916758***  
(0.000)   
.1372799** 
(0.016)    
-1.615374*** 
(0.000)    
-.1929678* 
(0.059)    
.9791056*** 
(0.000)    
.2447809*** 
(0.008)    
-.0004057 
(0.528)    
.0000148 
(0.813)    
ROA .0000154  
(0.72)   
.1821596 
(0.762)    
0.1525113** 
(0.013)    
-0.4131129*** 
(0.000)    
0.1758312*** 
(0.005)    
0.2614823*** 
(0.004)    
-1.605656*** 
(0.002)    
.0062176   
(0.436)  
-.0006597 




(0.023)    
.000562* 
(0.076)    
-.0021143 
(0.19)    
.000667 
(0.555)    
.0038737** 
(0.022)    
-.0041382*** 
(0.001)    
-.0000687 
(0.416)    
-2.64e-06 
(0.726)    
VOL 9.93e-08 
(0.777)    
-.0969441*    
(0.073) 
.0279449   
(0.112)  
-.0514383 
(0.562)    
-.1202356* 
(0.07)    




.0007114   
(0.46)  
.0001047  
(0.755)    
M_t_B 1.19e-08   
(0.898)  
.0125827 
(0.149)    
-.0016202  
(0.661)   
.1013839***    
(0.000) 
-.0106209 
(0.143)    
-.06917***  
(0.000)   
-.0338059*** 
(0.000)    
 
-4.57e-06 
(0.923)    




(0.732)    
-.1690557 
(0.288)    
.0051692 
(0.905)    
.0616145 
(0.814)    
-.2241429 
(0.263)    
.3876677  
(0.16)   
-.0665648 
(0.69)    
 
-.001265 
(0.468)    
-.0000195 
(0.827)     
Beta -1.71e-06  
(0.716)   
.2028768*** 
(0.000)     
.0472046** 
(0.041)    
-.1514849* 
(0.079)    
-.3414614***  
(0.000)   
-.0118104  
(0.887)   
 
.2083644***  
(0.000)   
.0014544 
(0.427)     
.0000566  






This tables summarizes the marginal effects for the credit rating analysis. The marginal effects 
indicate the probability of a firm having a particular credit rating category given a change in an 
explanatory variable while holding the explanatory variables fixed at their mean. The credit ratings 
are sorted in three categories: Low quality (BB+(Ba1) and lower), Medium quality (BBB- to BBB+ 
(Baa3 to Baa1)) and High quality (A-(A3) and higher). P-value are reported in the parenthesis 
below the coefficient.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 High quality Medium quality Low quality 
Environmental_Score -.0165699 






(0.68)    
.0011673    
(0.352) 
-.0017169 
(0.012)    
Governance_Score -.0001606  
(-0.857)    
-.0015728    
(0.061) 




   
-.0087217 
(0.002)    
-.0052538 
(0.002)    
Issue_Size .0663398  
(0.000)   
-.0410744 
(0.000)    
-.0252654 
(0.000)     
Firm_Size .2695103 
(0.000)    
-.1865347 
(0.000)    
-.0829755 
(0.000)    
Lev -2.23073 
(0.000)    
1.722842 
(0.000)    
.5078874 
(0.000)    
CapInt -.0141851 
(0.868)    
-.002968 
(0.0972)     
.0171531 
(0.704)    
ROA -.4156365 
(0.622)    
1.323641 
(0.089)     
-.9080034 
(0.005)    
IntCov .0052167 
(0.000)    
-.0001353 
(0.915)    
-.0050814 
(0.000)    
VOL -.2790061 
(0.000)    
.0839901 
(0.257)    





(0.000)    
-.0119192 
(0.016)    
Return_t1 .047349 
(0.839)    
.1191947 
(0.592)    
-.1665435 
(0.107)    
Beta .214358 
(0.002)    
-.3836362 
(0.000)    
.169278 






























This table summarizes the correlation between the three ESG factors.   
Environmental_Score Social_Score Governance_Score 
Environmental_Score 1.000 
  
Social_Score 0.2578 1.000 
 








































This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ social and governance performance and the 
cost of debt financing. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of a bond 
and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the social and governance 
measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The 
robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1) does not include any ESG factors, (2) 
includes the ES, (3) includes the social score, (4) includes the governance score and (5) includes 
the three ESG factors. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient.  * p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Environmental_Score  -0.000205***   -0.000199*** 
  (0.001)   (0.002) 
      
Social_Score   -0.0000672  -0.0000261 
   (0.266)  (0.683) 
      
Governance_Score    -0.0000400 -0.0000365 
    (0.288) (0.301) 
      
Maturity_Years 0.000859*** 0.000827*** 0.000863*** 0.000852*** 0.000820*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Issue_Size 0.00000641 0.000111 0.000193 0.000208 0.000103 
 (0.994) (0.899) (0.830) (0.814) (0.907) 
      
Callable_Dummy 0.00639 0.00718* 0.00690* 0.00690* 0.00718* 
 (0.111) (0.072) (0.086) (0.086) (0.071) 
      
Seniority_Dummy -0.000719 -0.000235 -0.00153 -0.000973 -0.00109 
 (0.828) (0.949) (0.662) (0.783) (0.766) 
      
Putable_Dummy 0 0.0210* 0.0222* 0.0206* 0.0201* 
 (.) (0.081) (0.080) (0.090) (0.086) 
      
Speculative 0.0147*** 0.0119*** 0.0134*** 0.0144*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) 
      
Firm_Size 0.00316*** 0.00397*** 0.00378*** 0.00357*** 0.00411*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
      
Credit_Rating 0.00200*** 0.00228*** 0.00215*** 0.00211*** 0.00216*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Lev -0.000365 -0.00204 -0.000674 -0.000857 -0.00163 
 (0.965) (0.804) (0.933) (0.914) (0.840) 
      
CapInt 0.00148 0.00322 0.00240 0.00276 0.00289 
 (0.696) (0.444) (0.554) (0.484) (0.498) 
      
Loss 0.00842** 0.00820** 0.00788** 0.00773** 0.00783** 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) 
      
ROA 0.0360** 0.0295 0.0298 0.0302 0.0299 
 (0.047) (0.192) (0.206) (0.211) (0.192) 
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IntCov 9.36e-08 0.00000447 0.00000395 0.00000267 0.00000472 
 (0.985) (0.468) (0.491) (0.667) (0.434) 
      
VOL 0.000399 0.00254 0.00254 0.00254 0.00308 
 (0.891) (0.446) (0.456) (0.434) (0.331) 
      
M_t_B -0.0000888 -0.000164* -0.000172* -0.000178* -0.000170* 
 (0.210) (0.077) (0.058) (0.051) (0.070) 
      
Return_t1 -0.000795 0.000104 0.00205 0.00256 0.000152 
 (0.873) (0.987) (0.758) (0.699) (0.981) 
      
Beta -0.00442 -0.00452 -0.00575 -0.00658* -0.00465 
 (0.253) (0.240) (0.141) (0.089) (0.219) 
      
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000667** 0.0000583* 0.0000423 0.0000425 0.0000549* 
 (0.021) (0.062) (0.174) (0.173) (0.065) 
      
Australia 0 0.0430*** 0.0440*** 0.0439*** 0.0442*** 
 (.) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Europe 0.00278 0.00368 0.00546 0.00425 0.00414 
 (0.583) (0.459) 
 
(0.260) (0.412) (0.373) 
_cons -0.0855** -0.0817** -0.0900** -0.0860** -0.0787** 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) 
R2 0.336 0.386 0.374 0.374 0.387 
N 1314 1348 1348 1348 1348 
     
     
     


























This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ social and governance performance and the 
cost of debt financing. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of a bond 
and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the social and governance measure 
and an array of control variables. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The robust 
Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1) uses the tercile decomposition of the social 
performance, (2) uses the quartile decomposition of the social performance, (3) uses the tercile 
decomposition of the governance performance, (4) uses the quartile decomposition of the 
governance performance. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient.  * p < 0.1, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Soc_Ter2 -0.00249    
 (0.165)    
     
Soc_Ter3 -0.00211    
 (0.352)    
     
Soc_Quart2  -0.00222   
  (0.190)   
     
Soc_Quart3  -0.00391*   
  (0.099)   
     
Soc_Quart4  -0.00149   
  (0.574)   
     
Gov_Ter2   -0.00380**  
   (0.023)  
     
Gov_Ter3   -0.00289*  
   (0.085)  
     
Gov_Quart2    -0.00360* 
    (0.098) 
     
Gov_Quart3    -0.00267 
    (0.211) 
     
Gov_Quart4    -0.00275 
    (0.233) 
     
Maturity_Years 0.000864*** 0.000870*** 0.000855*** 0.000861*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Issue_Size 0.000212 0.000119 0.000223 0.000224 
 (0.812) (0.894) (0.799) (0.800) 
     
Callable_Dummy 0.00595 0.00651* 0.00724* 0.00695* 
 (0.110) (0.098) (0.073) (0.083) 
     
Seniority_Dummy -0.00126 -0.00118 -0.00135 -0.00110 
 (0.695) (0.733) (0.688) (0.759) 
     
Putable_Dummy 0.0222* 0.0189 0.0224* 0.0228* 
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 (0.086) (0.144) (0.062) (0.071) 
     
Speculative 0.0132*** 0.0130*** 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Firm_Size 0.00351*** 0.00369*** 0.00356*** 0.00339*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
     
Credit_Rating 0.00214*** 0.00228*** 0.00214*** 0.00213*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Lev 0.00144 -0.000563 -0.00181 -0.00215 
 (0.855) (0.946) (0.812) (0.777) 
     
CapInt 0.00196 0.00179 0.00284 0.00345 
 (0.625) (0.679) (0.444) (0.366) 
     
Loss 0.00805** 0.00761** 0.00709** 0.00757** 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.048) (0.033) 
     
ROA 0.0340 0.0270 0.0280 0.0280 
 (0.119) (0.243) (0.236) (0.238) 
     
IntCov 0.00000535 0.00000451 0.00000411 0.00000341 
 (0.349) (0.447) (0.517) (0.591) 
     
VOL 0.00287 0.00269 0.00292 0.00209 
 (0.387) (0.421) (0.355) (0.511) 
     
M_t_B -0.0000263 -0.000181* -0.000203** -0.000192** 
 (0.182) (0.051) (0.026) (0.033) 
     
Return_t1 0.00168 0.00235 0.00276 0.00226 
 (0.796) (0.721) (0.679) (0.737) 
     
Beta -0.00602 -0.00622 -0.00657* -0.00610 
 (0.108) (0.114) (0.091) (0.117) 
     
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000452* 0.0000496 0.0000445 0.0000473 
 (0.096) (0.106) (0.167) (0.134) 
     
Australia 0.0439*** 0.0444*** 0.0439*** 0.0431*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Europe 0.00535 0.00455 0.00427 0.00420 
 (0.283) (0.355) (0.400) (0.411) 
     
     
_cons -0.0845** -0.0875** -0.0842** -0.0839** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) 
R2 0.370 0.377 0.379 0.377 







This table summarises the relationship between firms’ ESG performance and the cost of debt 
financing across Credit rating. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of a 
bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on ESG measures and an array of 
control variables. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The robust Standard Errors are 
cluster at the firm level. (1) uses Low quality (BB+(Ba1) and lower) bonds, (2) uses Medium 
quality (BBB- to BBB+ (Baa3 to Baa1)) bonds, (3) uses and High quality (A-(A3) and higher) 
bonds. P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient.   * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Environmental_Score -0.000209*** -0.0000978 0.000187 
 (0.000) (0.294) (0.293) 
    
Social_Score 0.000140** 0.000128** -0.000278** 
 (0.017) (0.035) (0.046) 
    
Governance_Score -0.0000128 -0.000122** 0.000151 
 (0.767) (0.037) (0.226) 
    
Maturity_Years 0.000700*** 0.000670*** 0.00119*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.008) 
    
Issue_Size -0.00102 0.000116 -0.00290* 
 (0.219) (0.911) (0.065) 
    
Callable_Dummy 0.00370 0.00242 0.0170*** 
 (0.425) (0.500) (0.001) 
    
Seniority_Dummy -0.00150 0 -0.0257 
 (0.546) (.) (0.127) 
    
Putable_Dummy 0 0 -0.00916 
 (.) (.) (0.650) 
    
Speculative 0 0 0.00159 
 (.) (.) (0.877) 
    
Firm_Size 0.000319 0.00384** 0.00648 
 (0.852) (0.010) (0.242) 
    
Credit_Rating -0.000773 0.00228 0.00201 
 (0.213) (0.431) (0.790) 
    
Lev 0.0210** 0.00495 -0.0331 
 (0.036) (0.579) (0.179) 
    
CapInt -0.00515 0.0133* 0.0295* 
 (0.158) (0.094) (0.089) 
    
Loss 0.00403 -0.00220 0.0181** 
 (0.135) (0.522) (0.011) 
    
ROA 0.0641* 0.0528** -0.0312 
 (0.094) (0.031) (0.494) 
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IntCov 0.00000537 0.0000542* 0.000168 
 (0.268) (0.079) (0.491) 
    
VOL -0.00143 0.00221 0.00927** 
 (0.652) (0.609) (0.019) 
    
M_t_B -0.00213* -0.0000164 0.00143 
 (0.065) (0.264) (0.307) 
    
Return_t1 -0.000246 -0.00442 0.00882 
 (0.960) (0.750) (0.488) 
    
Beta 0.00235 -0.00783* 0.0213 
 (0.428) (0.057) (0.101) 
    
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000491** 0.0000759** 0.0000252 
 (0.044) (0.040) (0.662) 
    
Australia 0.0380*** 0.0301*** 0.0646*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Europe -0.00208 0.00894** -0.0134** 
 (0.655) (0.044) (0.013) 
    
_cons 0.0128 -0.0942** -0.0303 
 (0.719) (0.048) (0.767) 
R2 0.478 0.345 0.747 






























This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing across country of issue. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield 
maturity of a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the 
environmental management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1) and (3) use bonds 
issue in Europe while (2) and (4) use bonds issued in Japan. P-value are reported in the parenthesis 
below the coefficient.   * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Environmental_Score -0.000173* 0.000000227   
 (0.070) 
 
(0.995)   
Social_Score -0.00000109 -0.0000880**   
 (0.990) (0.029)   
     
Governance_Score -0.000103* 0.0000138   
 (0.064) (0.323)   
     
Emissions_Score   -0.0000590 -0.0000368* 
   (0.334) (0.056) 
     
Innovation_Score   -0.0000885** -0.00000233 
   (0.039) (0.880) 
     
Resourceuse_Score   -0.0000314 0.0000433* 
   (0.598) (0.087) 
     
WorkforceScoreInthelast11F   -0.0000213 -0.0000520** 
   (0.625) (0.045) 
     
HumanRightsScoreInthelast1   0.0000221 -0.00000816 
   (0.550) (0.479) 
     
CommunityScoreInthelast11F   -0.0000440 -0.0000275 
   (0.212) (0.172) 
     
ProductResponsibilityScoreIn   0.0000786* -0.00000438 
   (0.088) (0.757) 
     
ManagementScoreInthelast11   -0.0000565 0.0000162 
   (0.218) (0.346) 
     
ShareholdersScoreInthelast1   0.00000745 -0.0000102 
   (0.850) (0.612) 
     
CSRStrategyScoreInthelast1   -0.000140** 0.0000366 
   (0.013) (0.273) 
     
Maturity_Years 0.000910*** 0.000675*** 0.000875*** 0.000696*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Issue_Size 0.00183*** 0.000969* 0.00167** 0.000894** 
 (0.009) (0.057) (0.011) (0.023) 
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Callable_Dummy 0.00143 0 0.00234 0 
 (0.572) (.) (0.363) (.) 
     
Seniority_Dummy 0 -0.00162 0 -0.00211 
 (.) (0.351) (.) (0.335) 
     
Putable_Dummy 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Speculative 0.00874 0.00843 0.00849 0.00808 
 (0.146) (0.111) (0.139) (0.140) 
     
Firm_Size 0.00359** -0.00123 0.00440*** -0.00133 
 (0.019) (0.259) (0.006) (0.252) 
     
Credit_Rating 0.00220* -0.00000679 0.00204** -0.0000984 
 (0.050) (0.978) (0.035) (0.746) 
     
Lev 0.00876 0.0182*** 0.00928 0.0174*** 
 (0.288) (0.000) (0.286) (0.000) 
     
CapInt 0.0164* -0.00520** 0.0212** -0.00437** 
 (0.071) (0.018) (0.014) (0.022) 
     
Loss 0.00994** 0.00377*** 0.0107** 0.00377** 
 (0.042) (0.005) (0.030) (0.012) 
     
ROA 0.0286 0.00615 0.0346 -0.00331 
 (0.187) (0.819) (0.139) (0.905) 
     
IntCov 0.0000179 -0.00000252 0.0000199 -0.00000211 
 (0.604) (0.447) (0.571) (0.541) 
     
VOL -0.000591 0.000802 0.000577 0.000125 
 (0.881) (0.512) (0.861) (0.940) 
     
M_t_B -0.000118 -0.000553 -0.00000461 -0.000615 
 (0.141) (0.472) (0.954) (0.370) 
     
Return_t1 -0.00877 0.00155 -0.00469 0.000654 
 (0.323) (0.568) (0.586) (0.771) 
     
Beta -0.00111 -0.00169 0.00108 -0.000836 
 (0.832) (0.341) (0.826) (0.630) 
     
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000807*** -0.0000235 0.0000757*** -0.0000271 
 (0.005) (0.371) (0.009) (0.324) 
     
Australia -0.0196* 0 -0.0186* 0 
 (0.051) (.) (0.070) (.) 
     
Europe -0.0426*** 0.0124*** -0.0430*** 0.0126** 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.011) 
     
_cons -0.0820* 0.0147 -0.0884* 0.0130 
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 (0.092) (0.642) (0.054) (0.707) 
R2 0.468 0.654 0.483 0.665 
























































This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing across country of issue. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the yield 
maturity of a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the 
environmental management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1) and (3) use bonds 
issue in Europe while (2) and (4) use bonds issued in Japan. P-value are reported in the parenthesis 
below the coefficient.   * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
     
Env_Ter2 -0.000707 0.000179   
 (0.664) (0.909)   
     
Env_Ter3 -0.000919 0.000558   
 (0.669) (0.731)   
     
Soc_Ter2 -0.00411 -0.00130   
 (0.290) (0.113)   
     
Soc_Ter3 -0.00237 -0.00170   
 (0.594) (0.220)   
     
Gov_Ter2 -0.00578*** 0.000151   
 (0.006) (0.847)   
     
Gov_Ter3 -0.00675*** 0.000215   
 (0.002) (0.802)   
     
Env_Quart2   -0.00293 0.000802 
   (0.227) (0.533) 
     
Env_Quart3   -0.00834*** 0.000921 
   (0.006) (0.526) 
     
Env_Quart4   -0.00948*** 0.00142 
   (0.001) (0.330) 
     
Gov_Quart2   0.00112 -0.00318*** 
   (0.722) (0.004) 
     
Gov_Quart3   -0.00210 -0.00372** 
   (0.558) (0.035) 
     
Gov_Quart4   0.00140 -0.00263 
   (0.713) (0.132) 
     
Soc_Quart2   -0.00427** 0.000202 
   (0.023) (0.682) 
     
Soc_Quart3   0.000196 0.0000696 
   (0.926) 
 
(0.915) 
Soc_Quart4   -0.00293 0.000802 




Maturity_Years 0.000909*** 0.000676*** 0.000877*** 0.000681*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Issue_Size 0.00188*** 0.00101** 0.00169** 0.00110*** 
 (0.007) (0.040) (0.012) (0.009) 
     
Callable_Dummy 0.00162 0 0.00137 0 
 (0.513) (.) (0.622) (.) 
     
Seniority_Dummy 0 -0.00100 0 -0.000824 
 (.) (0.557) (.) (0.613) 
     
Putable_Dummy 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Speculative 0.00859 0.00883 0.00719 0.00983* 
 (0.149) (0.128) (0.200) (0.070) 
     
Firm_Size 0.00298** -0.00159 0.00435*** -0.00130 
 (0.026) (0.102) (0.004) (0.207) 
     
Credit_Rating 0.00211* -0.0000392 0.00260** -0.000202 
 (0.052) (0.870) (0.016) (0.419) 
     
Lev 0.00782 0.0211*** 0.00785 0.0200*** 
 (0.380) (0.000) (0.340) (0.000) 
     
CapInt 0.0154* -0.00483** 0.0149 -0.00773*** 
 (0.092) (0.014) (0.121) (0.003) 
     
Loss 0.0106** 0.00408** 0.00966* 0.00349** 
 (0.038) (0.011) (0.056) (0.016) 
     
ROA 0.0295 0.0134 0.0321 0.00536 
 (0.176) (0.587) (0.141) (0.853) 
     
IntCov 0.0000147 -0.00000245 0.0000150 -0.00000164 
 (0.656) (0.493) (0.650) (0.644) 
     
VOL -0.000305 0.000890 0.000554 0.00127 
 (0.933) (0.498) (0.885) (0.258) 
     
M_t_B -0.000176** -0.000522 -0.000127* -0.000692 
 (0.023) (0.510) (0.100) (0.316) 
     
Return_t1 -0.00616 0.00189 -0.00928 0.00186 
 (0.476) (0.488) (0.296) (0.500) 
     
Beta -0.00182 -0.00216 -0.00291 -0.00208 
 (0.722) (0.259) (0.594) (0.192) 
     
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000569* -0.0000294 0.000112*** -0.0000255 
 (0.088) (0.276) (0.001) (0.321) 
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Australia -0.0217** 0 -0.0161 0 
 (0.019) (.) (0.119) (.) 
     
Europe -0.0437*** 0.0123** -0.0404*** 0.0127** 
 (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.012) 
     
_cons -0.0764 0.0164 -0.107** 0.0135 
 (0.112) (0.536) (0.029) (0.598) 
R2 0.472 0.643 0.488 0.660 
N 802 532 802 532 
















































This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing while controlling for the performance in the year prior the bond issue. I regress the 
logarithm of the spread between the yield maturity of a bond and the corresponding government 
rate of the same maturity on the environmental management measure and an array of control 
variables. All models include year and industry fixed effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster 
at the firm level. (1) uses the decomposition of the ESG combined scores. (2)  uses the 
decomposition of the each ESG scores.  P-value are reported in the parenthesis below the 
coefficient.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Environmental_Score -0.000243***  -0.000252** -0.000313** 




















Social_Score -0.0000268  -0.0000211 -0.0000227 
 (0.674)  (0.758) (0.731) 
     
Governance_Score -0.0000349  -0.0000190 0.0000184 
 (0.321)  (0.675) (0.672) 
     
Environmental_Score_t_1 0.0000527    
 (0.474)    
     
Emissions_Score  -0.0000706   
  (0.375)   
     
Resourceuse_Score  -0.0000841   
  (0.339)   
     
Innovation_Score  -0.0000920***   
  (0.003)   
     
Emissionst1_Score  -0.0000211   
  (0.797)   
     
Ressourcet1_Score  0.000111   
  (0.152)   
     
Innovationt1_Score  -0.0000164   
  (0.550)   
     
WorkforceScoreInthelast11F  -0.0000258   
  (0.543)   
     
HumanRightsScoreInthelast1  0.00000304   
  (0.893)   
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CommunityScoreInthelast11F  -0.0000383   
  (0.217)   
     
ProductResponsibilityScoreIn  0.0000261   
  (0.378)   
     
ManagementScoreInthelast11  -0.0000121   
  (0.709)   
     
ShareholdersScoreInthelast1  -0.0000106   
  (0.737)   
     
CSRStrategyScoreInthelast1  -0.0000258   
  (0.523)   
     
Maturity_Years 0.000818*** 0.000806*** 0.000869*** 0.000773*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Issue_Size 0.0000908 0.0000470 0.000149 0.000420 
 (0.917) (0.956) (0.873) (0.615) 
     
Callable_Dummy 0.00719* 0.00748* 0.00781 -0.00240 
 (0.071) (0.053) (0.190) (0.508) 
     
Seniority_Dummy -0.00115 -0.00345 -0.000952 0.000298 
 (0.752) (0.396) (0.846) (0.951) 
     
Putable_Dummy 0.0201* 0.0203* 0.0165 0.0162 
 (0.086) (0.066) (0.111) (0.119) 
     
Speculative 0.0123*** 0.0125*** 0.0104** 0.00688 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.030) (0.108) 
     
Firm_Size 0.00407*** 0.00410*** 0.00402*** 0.00278** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.030) 
     
Credit_Rating 0.00217*** 0.00223*** 0.00265*** 0.00238*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
     
Lev -0.00137 -0.00301 -0.00173 -0.00384 
 (0.866) (0.718) (0.842) (0.649) 
     
CapInt 0.00293 0.00165 0.00528 0.00608 
 (0.490) (0.713) (0.283) (0.213) 
     
Loss 0.00775** 0.00763** 0.0101** 0.0109** 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.034) (0.016) 
     
ROA 0.0307 0.0266 0.0283 0.00814 
 (0.186) (0.264) (0.235) (0.746) 
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IntCov 0.00000463 0.00000369 0.00000442 0.00000287 
 (0.440) (0.524) (0.418) (0.547) 
     
VOL 0.00307 0.00309 0.00357 0.00487 
 (0.331) (0.286) (0.439) (0.263) 
     
M_t_B -0.000175* -0.000175 -0.000213* -0.000179 
 (0.063) (0.113) (0.059) (0.127) 
     
Return_t1 0.000231 0.000172 -0.00491 -0.000564 
 (0.971) (0.976) (0.621) (0.966) 
     
Beta -0.00467 -0.00456 -0.00536 -0.00666* 
 (0.218) (0.246) (0.191) (0.069) 
     
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000545* 0.0000467 0.0000515 0.0000395 
 (0.066) (0.120) (0.137) (0.324) 
     
Australia 0.0442*** 0.0436*** 0.0474*** 0.0482*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Europe 0.00408 0.00393 0.00384 0.00775* 
 (0.382) (0.358) (0.439) (0.055) 
     
_cons -0.0786** -0.0770** -0.0826** -0.0597* 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.093) 
R2 0.388 0.396 0.438 0.433 



























This table documents the results of the matched firm approach. The covariates for those approaches are all the 
control variables besides Callable Dummy, Puttable dummy, Seniority dummy and Loss Dummy. Column 
(1) and (2) use propensity score matching. (1) consider the upper half distribution of the ES as the treatment 
group while (2) considers upper quartile of the environmental distribution as the treatment group. Column (3) 
and (4) use the Nearest-Neighbor matching method according to the Mahalanobis distance. The treatment 
groups for (3) and (4) are similar to (1) and (2). Column (5) and (6) use the Multivariate-distance kernel 
matching according to the Mahalanobis distance. The treatment groups for (5) and (6) are similar to (1) and 
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Average treatment of treated 
Env_Half 
 
    -0.00335  





























This table summarises the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing while including firm fixed-effect. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the 
yield maturity of a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the 
environmental management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. (1) uses the 
decomposition of the ESG combined scores. (3) sorts the firms in terciles according to their ESG 
scores (2) sorts the firms in quartiles according to ESG scores. P-value are reported in the 
parenthesis below the coefficient.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Environmental_Score -0.000128   
 (0.114)   
    
Social_Score -0.00000561   
 (0.933)   
    
Governance_Score -0.0000177   
 (0.717)   
    
Env_Ter2  -0.000624  
  (0.737)  
    
Env_Ter3  -0.000985  
  (0.608)  
    
Soc_Ter2  -0.00107  
  (0.562)  
    
Soc_Ter3  -0.000201  
  (0.937)  
    
Gov_Ter2  -0.00296  
  (0.116)  
    
Gov_Ter3  -0.00257  
  (0.267)  
    
Env_Quart2   -0.00180 
   (0.442) 
    
Env_Quart3   -0.00439* 
   (0.069) 
    
Env_Quart4   -0.00481** 
   (0.023) 
    
Gov_Quart2   -0.00336 
   (0.119) 
    
Gov_Quart3   -0.00246 
   (0.308) 
    
Gov_Quart4   -0.00121 
   (0.638) 
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Soc_Quart2   0.00167 
   (0.256) 
    
Soc_Quart3   0.000456 
   (0.801) 
    
Soc_Quart4   0.00180 
   (0.490) 
    
Maturity_Years 0.000893*** 0.000910*** 0.000895*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Issue_Size -0.000668 -0.000666 -0.000656 
 (0.456) (0.450) (0.444) 
    
Callable_Dummy 0.00830* 0.00820* 0.00828* 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.056) 
    
Seniority_Dummy -0.00121 -0.00139 -0.000766 
 (0.654) (0.576) (0.792) 
    
Putable_Dummy 0.0558*** 0.0599*** 0.0589*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Speculative 0.00313 0.00318 0.00468 
 (0.402) (0.432) (0.196) 
    
Firm_Size 0.00293* 0.00270* 0.00277* 
 (0.055) (0.060) (0.053) 
    
Credit_Rating 0.00109 0.000890 0.00115 
 (0.175) (0.217) (0.140) 
    
Lev 0.00433 0.00522 0.00534 
 (0.686) (0.600) (0.617) 
    
CapInt -0.00205 -0.00186 0.000546 
 (0.734) (0.750) (0.933) 
    
Loss 0.00677*** 0.00671** 0.00690*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) 
    
ROA 0.0158 0.0165 0.0155 
 (0.412) (0.389) (0.438) 
    
IntCov 0.0000524*** 0.0000568*** 0.0000552*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
    
VOL 0.00153 0.00178 0.00115 
 (0.578) (0.504) (0.640) 
    
M_t_B -0.0000429 -0.0000859 -0.0000450 
 (0.639) (0.365) (0.639) 
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Return_t1 -0.00412 -0.00378 -0.00532 
 (0.480) (0.527) (0.398) 
    
Beta 0.000861 -0.000657 0.000171 
 (0.768) (0.835) (0.954) 
    
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000690 0.0000777 0.0000851* 
 (0.158) (0.108) (0.080) 
    
Australia 0.0196*** 0.0193*** 0.0179*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Europe 0.00178 0.00226 0.000592 
 (0.693) (0.622) (0.892) 
    
_cons -0.0495 -0.0502 -0.0563* 
 (0.165) (0.140) (0.096) 
R2 0.490 0.491 0.497 




















This table summarizes the relationship between firms’ environmental management and the cost of 
debt financing across environmental score terciles. I regress the logarithm of the spread between the 
yield maturity of a bond and the corresponding government rate of the same maturity on the 
environmental management measure and an array of control variables. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects. The robust Standard Errors are cluster at the firm level. This table uses the 
ESG combined scores. The dataset has been divided into 3 terciles: (1) Bonds in the first tercile of 
the ES distribution (2) Bonds in the second tercile of the ES distribution and (3) Bonds in the first 
third of the ES distribution, the third being composed of the firms with the highest ES. P-value are 
reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 LnSpread LnSpread LnSpread 
Environmental_Score -0.000366*** -0.000550 -0.000121 
 (0.004) (0.136) (0.592) 
    
Social_Score -0.00000604 -0.0000764 -0.000149* 
 (0.960) (0.376) (0.059) 
    
Governance_Score 0.0000454 -0.0000400 -0.0000740 
 (0.433) (0.507) (0.132) 
    
Maturity_Years 0.00115*** 0.000434*** 0.000585*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.001) 
    
Issue_Size -0.000856 -0.00187 0.000700 
 (0.529) (0.141) (0.321) 
    
Callable_Dummy 0.00738 0.00648 0.00636* 
 (0.136) (0.433) (0.063) 
    
Seniority_Dummy 0.000271 -0.00478 0.000828 
 (0.968) (0.368) (0.849) 
    
Putable_Dummy 0.0419*** 0 0 
 (0.005) (.) (.) 
    
Speculative 0.00385 0.0211*** 0.0113 
 (0.585) (0.000) (0.106) 
    
Firm_Size 0.00211 0.00427*** 0.00338** 
 (0.259) (0.001) (0.040) 
    
Credit_Rating 0.00168 -0.000659 0.00253*** 
 (0.235) (0.422) (0.003) 
    
Lev 0.0536*** 0.00653 -0.0201* 
 (0.000) (0.661) (0.058) 
    
CapInt 0.00383 -0.00354 0.0124** 
 (0.550) (0.490) (0.036) 
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Loss 0.00255 0.00632* 0.0156** 
 (0.684) (0.068) (0.028) 
    
ROA 0.0194 0.0555* 0.0695*** 
 (0.476) (0.084) (0.008) 
    
IntCov 0.000113*** -0.0000954** -0.00000425 
 (0.001) (0.024) (0.471) 
    
VOL 0.00106 0.00704* 0.00346 
 (0.834) (0.088) (0.285) 
    
M_t_B 0.000102 -0.000106 -0.000457** 
 (0.361) (0.399) (0.024) 
    
Return_t1 0.0212 -0.00951 0.00148 
 (0.210) (0.428) (0.834) 
    
Beta -0.00155 -0.0123** -0.00204 
 (0.742) (0.020) (0.636) 
    
Inst_Own_Per 0.0000837 0.0000404 -0.0000200 
 (0.215) (0.505) (0.646) 
    
Australia 0.0653*** 0.0271*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.004) 
    
Europe 0.00179 -0.00982 0.00974*** 
 (0.798) (0.173) (0.007) 
    
_cons -0.0545 0.0293 -0.0572 
 (0.467) (0.468) (0.198) 
R2 0.557 0.477 0.454 
N 425 445 478 
 
